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I. JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Plaintiffs-Appellants MFS Series Trust III (on behalf of MFS Municipal 
High Income Fund), Merrill Lynch High Yield Municipal Bond Fund, Inc., 
Muniholdings Fund, Inc., Merrill Lynch Municipal Bond Fund, The National 
Portfolio, Merrill Lynch Municipal Strategy Fund, Eaton Vance Distributors, Inc., 
T. Rowe Price Associates, Inc., John Hancock Funds, Inc., and Putnam 
Investments, Inc. ("Plaintiffs-Appellants") are mutual funds or mutual fund 
managers who have collectively sued Defendants-Appellees, the former officers 
and directors of Safety-Kleen Corp., formerly known as Laidlaw Environmental 
Services, Inc., for violations of Utah's securities laws as well as common law 
fraud and negligent misrepresentation. Defendants-Appellees John R. Grainger, 
James R. Bullock, John W. Rollins, Jr., John W. Rollins, Sr., Leslie W. Haworth, 
David B. Thomas, Jr., Henry B. Tippie, James L. Wareham, Grover C. Wrenn, 
Michael J. Bragagnolo and Henry H. Taylor ("Defendants-Appellees") moved to 
dismiss Plaintiffs-Appellants' complaint (the "Complaint") for lack of personal 
jurisdiction. The trial court concluded that it lacked personal jurisdiction over 
Defendants-Appellees and dismissed the Complaint. 
The Supreme Court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. 1953 § 78-2-2(3)0), as amended. The dismissal by the Third District Court 
of the Complaint with respect to Defendants-Appellees for lack of personal 
jurisdiction was certified as a final judgment under Rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure on August 6, 2002. 
- 1 -Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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Plaintiffs-Appellants seek rescissory, compensatory, and punitive damages 
in an amount to be proved at trial, including treble damages pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. § 61-1-22(2), together with appropriate pre-judgment interest on the 
purchase price of the Bonds described below at the maximum rate allowable by 
law. The total purchase price of the Bonds in 1997 was $45.7 million. 
II. STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW AND 
STANDARDS FOR REVIEW 
The issue presented by this appeal is whether a Utah court may properly 
exercise personal jurisdiction over (a) a corporation's officers and directors who 
are alleged to be personally liable for violating Utah's securities laws, regardless 
of the officers and directors' states of residence, and (b) officers and directors who 
in person or through an agent transact business in this state giving rise to 
Plaintiffs-Appellants' claims. The issue stems from the trial court's granting of 
the collective motions by Appellees in the proceeding below to dismiss Plaintiffs-
Appellants' Complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction. 
The District Court made its ruling on personal jurisdiction based on 
documentary evidence alone. Hence, the Supreme Court may review the District 
Court's decision for "correctness." See Phone Directories Co., Inc. v. Henderson, 
8 P.3d 256, 258 (Utah 2000) (citing Arguello v. Industrial Woodworking Mach. 
Co., 838 P. 2d 1120, 1121 (Utah 1992)). "Because the propriety of a motion to 
dismiss is a question of law," the Utah Supreme Court "review[s] for correctness, 
giving no deference to the decision of the trial court." Wagner v. Clifton, 62 P.3d 
252224.2 
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440, 441 (Utah 2002). 
On September 4, 2002, Appellants filed a timely notice of appeal g 
preserving this issue. (RA 0559-0552). 
III. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case and Procedural History. 
This action arises out of the issuance (the "Issuance") by Tooele County of 
Pollution Control Refunding Revenue Bonds (uthe Bonds") on July 1, 1997, ^ 
secured by a loan agreement (the "Loan Agreement") between the County of 
Tooele (the "Issuer" or the "County") and Laidlaw Environmental Services, Inc. 
i 
("LES" or "the Borrower") and its successor-entity, Safety-Kleen Corporation 
("Safety-Kleen" or "the Company"). (RA 022, 020)1. 
In April/May 1998, LES, which had been a partially-owned subsidiary of | 
Laidlaw, Inc. ("Laidlaw"), merged with and assumed the name of Safety-Kleen 
Corporation. (RA 020, 017). Safety-Kleen, as successor-entity to LES, then 
( 
assumed the obligations under the loan securing the securities at issue. 
Appellants, in purchasing the Bonds, relied on a series of financial 
statements of LES incorporated by the offering documents underlying the ' 
Issuance, including quarterly and annual statements of LES' financial performance 
through July 1997. (RA 06, 012, 011). These financial statements were later 
admitted by the Company to contain material misstatements and fraudulently 
1
 "RA" refers to the record on appeal, prepared and paginated by the Clerk 
of the Third District Court, Tooele County in accordance with Rule 11 of the Utah < 
Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
? ^ ? ? ? d ? 
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reported revenue, resulting in the Bonds' plummet in value and the termination of 
several of the Company's officers. In sum, the principal officers of the Company, 
including Paul R. Humphreys ("Humphreys"), Bragagnolo, and Kenneth W. 
Winger ("Winger") oversaw a massive fraud in the debt and assets reporting 
structure of the Company, resulting in an overstatement of what the Company has 
admitted to be over half a billion dollars in revenues from the beginning of fiscal 
year 1997 (which began on August 31, 1996, or nearly one year prior to the 
Issuance) until 1999. (RA 017-011, 0744, 0610-0606)2. 
Appellants brought suit in Tooele County on July 1, 2001, to recover their 
losses under Utah's securities laws, as well as under common law theories of fraud 
and negligence. (RA 023-01). At the heart of the Complaint were the very 
"accounting irregularities" referred to in the Company's press releases, resulting in 
material misrepresentations of the Company's financial performance and hence 
the true value of the securities offered in the Issuance. (RA 017-011). 
Defendants-Appellees moved to dismiss the Complaint for lack of personal 
2
 RA 0579-0754 consists of, inter alia, Plaintiffs' Opposition to Defendants' 
Motions to Dismiss the Complaint for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction, along with 
attached exhibits, originally filed and served on February 22, 2002. These 
materials appear out of sequence chronologically in the Record on Appeal because 
they were at first inadvertently omitted by the trial court from the Record on 
Appeal. The trial court ordered that these materials be appended to the Record on 
Appeal on April 14, 2003. See RA 0581-0580 and Amended Index of Record on 
Appeal. 
252224.2 
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jurisdiction.3 (RA 0312, 0181, 098, 041). None of the Appellees claimed that the 
service of process or notice of the Complaint itself was defective, but rather € 
argued that the trial court lacked personal jurisdiction over them on constitutional 
grounds. (RA 091-085, 0161-0140, 0306-0290, 0318-0317). Immediately after 
oral argument on May 13, 2002, the trial court indicated that Defendants' motions 
would be granted, (RA 0578, p. 20) and an order dismissing the Complaint was 
entered on June 19,2002. (RA 0517). " * I 
Plaintiffs-Appellants filed their first notice of appeal on July 18, 2002. (RA 
0524-0519). Since the Order of Final Judgment on the trial court's dismissal was g 
not entered until August 6, 2002, however, Plaintiffs-Appellants were required to 
file another notice of appeal and dismiss the previous appeal, which had been 
i 
assigned Supreme Court Case No. 20020617. (RA 0555). On September 4, 2002, 
Appellants filed a timely notice of appeal giving rise to the present appeal, which 
was assigned Supreme Court Case No. 20020719. (RA 0559-0552). i 
B. Facts Relevant to Issues Presented for Review-
1. This action arises out of the Issuance of the Bonds on July 1, 1997, 
i 
secured by the Loan Agreement pursued by LES and its successor-entity, Safety-
Kleen. (RA 022, 020). 
•
 :
' ' ( 
3
 Appellees filed four separate motions on January 22, 2002, either 
collectively or individually, as follows: on behalf of David E. Thomas, Jr., John 
W. Rollins, Jr., John W. Rollins, Sr., James L. Wareham, Grover C. Wrenn, and 
Henry B. Tippie (RA 098); on behalf of James R. Bullock, John R. Grainger, and 
Leslie W. Haworth (RA 041); on behalf of Henry H. Taylor (RA 0181); and on 
behalf of Michael Bragagnolo (RA 0312). 
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2. The costs of the Issuance were paid by LES. See Preliminary 
Offering Memorandum dated June 23, 1997 ("Offering") (RA 0746, 0647-0646)4. 
3. According to the Loan Agreement (RA 0643-0610), LES itself 
"requested that the County issue" the Bonds in order to refund and retire an earlier 
bond issuance and to continue financing "the costs of acquisition and construction 
by the Borrower [LES]" of a "Project." This Project consisted of constructing and 
operating "certain hazardous waste disposal facilities in the County." (RA 0639). 
4. The $45.7 million "Project" was "owned by the Borrower [LES]." 
Id. (emphasis added). 
5. According to the Offering, the Bonds were to be "limited 
obligations" of the County, and "payable solely from and secured by a pledge of 
the revenues to be derived pursuant to [the] loan agreement" between the County 
and LES. This Loan Agreement - between the Borrower and the County - was 
entered into in this State, and by its own terms is governed by Utah law. (RA 
0615). 
6. The Loan Agreement was signed on behalf of LES by defendant 
4
 The trial court inadvertently failed to paginate alternate pages of a double-
sided document which originally appeared as Exhibit A in support of Plaintiffs' 
Opposition to Defendants' Motions to Dismiss for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction. 
(See RA 0717-0644 and alternating pages). RA 0754-0579, of which these pages 
are a part, were not made a part of the Record on Appeal until April 13, 2003, and 
were not produced to Appellants until April 17, 2003, therefore not permitting 
enough time for the trial court to correct the error before Appellants' opening brief 
was due. Therefore, where Appellants need to cite to text appearing on a page 
which was not assigned a page number by the trial court, Appellants herein will 
cite the page numbers between which the cited text may be found. 
252224.2 
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Paul Humphreys, acting as Senior Vice-President and Chief Financial Officer of 
LES, and attested to by defendant Henry Taylor, acting as Vice-President, General 
Counsel and Secretary of LES. (RA 0613). The Issuance was valued at $45.7 
million. (RA 0645-0644; See FN 4). 
7. For the benefit of potential purchasers, the Offering incorporated 
directly or by reference numerous financial statements from portions of the fiscal 
year ending August 31, 1997, containing SEC filings and pro forma financial 
either consisting solely of or incorporating LES' financial results, which were later 
withdrawn and admitted by the Company to contain material misstatements.5 
(RA012). 
8. Appellants are institutional purchasers who purchased and held the 
Bonds on behalf of themselves or various mutual funds. (RA 021). 
5
 The financial reports at issue are recited in the Complaint and include, 
inter alia, Laidlaw, Inc.'s Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q for the first quarter 
ended November 30, 1996; Laidlaw, Inc.'s Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q for the 
second quarter ended February 28, 1997; LES' Reports on Form 8-K dated May 
30, 1997 and June 11; Pro Forma Condensed Combined Summary Financial Data 
for Rollins Environmental Services, Inc. and Laidlaw Subsidiaries (including 
LES) for the six months ended February 28, 1997; Pro Forma Combined Financial 
Statements and Statement of Operations for Rollins Environmental Services, Inc. 
and Laidlaw Subsidiaries for the six months ended February 28, 1997; Laidlaw 
Hazardous Waste Services Management's Discussion and Analysis of Financial 
Condition and Results of Operations for the six months ended February 28, 1997; 
Laidlaw Hazardous Waste Services Combined Statements of Income for the six 
months ended February 28, 1997; and Laidlaw Hazardous Waste Services 
Combined Statements of Cash Flows for the six months ended February 28, 1997. 
Laidlaw, Inc.'s Quarterly Reports incorporated financial statements from its 
subsidiaries, including LES. (RA 012-011). 
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9. Under the heading "Notice to Investors," the Offering provided that 
"[e]ach initial purchaser ha[d] been provided with access to such financial or other 
information as it has requested in connection with its decision to purchase any 
Bonds." (RA 0745). According to the Offering, the "Company ha[d] [further] 
covenanted for the benefit of the holders and beneficial owners of the Bonds to 
provide certain financial information and operating data relating to the Company 
by not later than 180 days following the end of the Company's fiscal year." (RA 
0745,0655) 
10. The Proposed Form of Continuing Disclosure Agreement, 
incorporated as Appendix C to the Offering, further stated that the content of such 
disclosure "shall contain or incorporate by reference...a copy of [the Company's] 
annual financial statements prepared in accordance with generally accepted 
accounting principles," and that this agreement would also be governed by Utah 
law. (RA 0716-0714). 
11. LES changed its name to Safety-Kleen Corporation on November 
25, 1998, after acquiring all of the outstanding capital stock of the former Safety-
Kleen Corporation and replacing the entire board of the old Safety-Kleen with the 
directors of LES. (RA 020). 
12. Less than three years after the Issuance, the Company announced 
that its previously reported financial statements for the fiscal years ending August 
31, 1999, 1998 and 1997 - thereby including several quarters leading up to the 
time of the Issuance, when it was operating as LES - had been materially 
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misstated, and would be withdrawn. (RA 017). The Company also placed its 
three top executives - including Bragagnolo, Humphreys, and Winger - on leave 
while the Company investigated the extent to which the financials would need to 
be restated as a result of the Company's "accounting irregularities." (RA 012). 
These three executives later resigned. Id. The value of the Bonds plunged almost 
immediately after the Company's announcement, and since have been rendered 
valueless. (RA011). 
13. Winger and Humphreys have not Answered or otherwise responded 
to the Summons served on them on October 29 and 30, 2001, respectively, and are 
therefore not parties to this appeal. (RA 0744). 
14. On July 9, 2001, or over one week after the filing of the Complaint 
in this action, the Company finally issued its restated financials for fiscal years 
1997 through 1999, as well as the first quarter of 2000, announcing "an overall 
reduction in previously reported earnings of approximately $534 million for fiscal 
years 1997-1999, and a loss of approximately $833 million in fiscal year 2000." 
(RA 0610-0608). 
15. The restatements were made necessary, in the words of Defendant 
David E. Thomas, Jr., due to "unfortunate... accounting irregularities" which took 
place during fiscal years 1997-1999. Id. These accounting irregularities are 
detailed in the Complaint (RA 017-011), and remain completely uncontroverted 
by Defendants-Appellees. 
16. Further, by definition (Accounting Principles Board Opinion No. 
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20), a restatement of financial statements means that those financial statements 
when issued were materially false. (RA 010). 
17. At the time the Bonds were issued, LES was a partially-owned 
subsidiary of Laidlaw, Inc. ("Laidlaw"). (RA020). On June 24, 2001, or 
approximately one week prior to the filing of this action, Laidlaw filed for Chapter 
11 bankruptcy protection. Hence, Laidlaw is not named as a defendant in this 
case. Id. Safety-Kleen, the successor entity to LES, filed a bankruptcy petition 
over one year earlier, on June 9, 2000, and hence is also not named as a defendant 
in this case. (RA021). 
18. In the offering papers touting the Issuance, LES identified its 
"Executive Officers and Directors" as consisting of, among others, Appellees 
Michael Bragagnolo ("Bragagnolo"), Henry H. Taylor ("Taylor"), James R. 
Bullock ("Bullock"), John R. Grainger ("Grainger"), Leslie W. Haworth 
("Haworth"), John W. Rollins, Sr. ("Rollins, Sr."), John W. Rollins, Jr. ("Rollins, 
Jr."), David B. Thomas ("Thomas"), Henry B. Tippie ("Tippie"), and James L. 
Wareham ("Wareham").6 (RA 0682). 
19. Defendants Haworth, Tippie, and Wareham (two of whom are self-
identified in their moving papers as "Outside Director Defendants") are in fact 
further identified as "Audit Committee Members," "responsible for," inter alia, 
6
 Respondent Grover C. Wrenn ("Wrenn") has been an officer or director of 
the Company since July 1997, or starting shortly after the Issuance. (RA 0175). 
As such, statutory liability may not attach to Wrenn under the Utah securities 
laws. Appellants thus do not resist Wrenn's motion. 
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"the oversight of the Company's financial reporting process and internal controls" 
as well as "considering major changes and major questions of choice regarding 
appropriate auditing and accounting principles and practices to be followed when 
preparing corporate financial statements." (RA 0683, 0682). 
20. Each of the Appellees, with the exception of Wrenn, admit to being 
officers or directors of the Company at the time of the Offering. (See Defendants' 
Affidavits at RA 027-024, 032-028, 037-033, 0164-0162, 0167-0165, 0170-0168, 
0173-0171, 0176-0174, 0179-0177).7 
21. Each of the Appellees resides outside of Utah. Id. 
22. The foregoing facts were uncontested by Defendants-Appellees in 
their Affidavits. Id. 
IV. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
As set forth above, the issue raised in this appeal is whether a Utah court 
may properly exercise personal jurisdiction over a corporation's officers and 
directors who, through their action or inaction having effects in this state, are 
alleged to be personally liable for violating Utah's securities laws. 
Sections 61-1-1 et seq. of the Utah Annotated Codes regulate the offer and 
sale of securities in this state. Section 61-1-22(4) explicitly provides for the joint 
and several liability of directors and officers of a person or entity that may be held 
7
 "Defendants' Affidavits" refers to the Affidavit of Henry B. Tippie; Affidavit of 
David E. Thomas, Jr.; Affidavit of John W. Rollins, Jr.; Affidavit of James L. 
Wareham; Affidavit of Grover C. Wrenn; Affidavit of Henry B. Tippie; Affidavit 
of Henry H. Taylor; Affidavit of James R. Bullock; Affidavit of John R. Grainger; 
Affidavit of Leslie W. Haworth; Affidavit of Michael Bragagnolo. 
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liable under the securities laws, and shifts the burden onto these individuals to 
prove as a matter of law their lack of knowledge or reason to know of the facts 
giving rise to the liability of the person or entity they are presumed to have 
controlled. See Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-22(4). For the purposes of establishing 
liability, then, Utah's securities statutes presume that corporate officers and 
directors have undertaken actions (or actionable inaction) having effects in the 
state of Utah, absent a showing by the same corporate officers and directors that 
they did not know or could not reasonably have known of the facts giving rise to 
the liability of the corporation or agents they are presumed to have controlled. 
Utah's long arm jurisdiction statute specifically provides for personal jurisdiction 
over out-of-state actors whose activities "affect persons or businesses within the 
state of Utah." See Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-27-24, 78-27-23. Additionally, where 
personal service is otherwise impossible to obtain, Utah has enacted a fail-safe 
method of both serving process on and obtaining personal jurisdiction over 
individuals such as Appellees. See Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-26. The trial court 
below, however, failed to correctly apply Utah law in its jurisdictional analysis. 
For the reasons discussed below, Utah may properly exercise personal jurisdiction 
over Appellees, and their collective motions to dismiss the Complaint should be 
denied. 
V- ARGUMENT 
Under Utah law, a three-part inquiry is used to determine whether a court 
may exercise specific personal jurisdiction over a defendant. These parts include 
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(a) that the defendant's acts or contacts implicate Utah under the Utah long-arm 
statute; (b) that a "nexus" exists between the plaintiffs' claims and the defendant's ^ 
acts or contacts; and (c) that the application of the long-arm statute does not offend 
due process. Harnischfeger Engineers, Inc. v. Uniflo Conveyor, Inc., 883 F. Supp. 
608 (D. Utah 1995) (superseded by statute on other grounds). Upon application of 
these criteria, a Utah court may exercise specific jurisdiction over each of the 
Appellees. ( 
A. Legal Standards. 
Under Utah's long-arm statute, Courts may "assert jurisdiction over non-
i 
resident defendants to the fullest extent permitted" by the due process clause of the 
U.S. Constitution. SII Megadiamond, Inc. v. American Superabrasives, Corp., 
969 P.2d 430 (Utah 1998) (citing Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-22)). The Utah i 
Supreme Court has, in its own words, "explicitly upheld that policy." Id. (citing 
Synergistics v. Marathon Ranching Co., 701 P.2d 1106 (Utah 1985)). Under the 
federal Constitution's due process clause, a court may assume jurisdiction over a 
nonresident defendant when the defendant has constitutionally sufficient 
"minimum contacts" with the forum state. See Neways, Inc. v. McCausland, 950 
P.2d 420, 423 (Utah 1997) (citing Abbott G.M. Diesel Inc. v. Piper Aircraft 
Corp., 578 P.2d 850 (Utah 1978)). Section 78-27-24 permits the exercise of
 ( 
personal jurisdiction over "any person.. .whether or not a citizen or resident of this 
state, who in person or through an agent does any" of a number of acts, including, 
i 
inter alia, "the transaction of any business within this state," "the ownership, use, 
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or possession of any real estate situated in this state," and "contracting to insure 
any person, property, or risk located within this state at the time of contracting." 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-24 (emphasis added). The "transaction of business" 
within this state is defined as "activities of a non-resident person, his agents, or 
representatives in this state which affect persons or businesses within the state of 
Utah." Harnischfeger Engineers, Inc., 883 F. Supp. at 612 (citing Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-27-23). A person may hence transact business within the state even if they 
are not physically present in Utah. Id. 
Personal jurisdiction may be "general" or "specific." (Perkins v. Benguet 
Mining Co. (1952) 342 U.S. 437). Appellants in this case argue that specific 
personal jurisdiction obtains over Appellees. Specific personal jurisdiction arises 
over a non-resident defendant who "has only minimum contacts with the forum 
but only [as to] claims arising out of [the] defendant's forum-state activity." 
Neways, 950 P.2d at 423; see also Burger King Co. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 
472-73(1985). 
Courts addressing a motion to dismiss a complaint for lack of personal 
jurisdiction must take care to avoid resolving the merits of the controversy. When 
a question of personal jurisdiction is to be resolved on documentary evidence, "the 
plaintiff is only required to make a prima facie showing of personal jurisdiction." 
Neways, 950 P.2d at 422 (citing Anderson v. American Society of Plastic 
Surgeons, 807 P.2d 825 (Utah 1990)). A prima facie showing requires "the 
establishment of a legally required rebuttable presumption... [or] [t]he plaintiffs 
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production of enough evidence to allow the fact-trier to infer the fact at issue and 
rule in the plaintiffs favor." Black's Law Dictionary 498 (West Pocket Ed. 1996). ^ 
In determining this, "[t]he plaintiffs factual allegations are accepted as true unless 
specifically controverted by the defendant's affidavits or by depositions." 
i 
Neways, 950 P.2d at 422 (emphasis added); Cf. Roskelley & Co. v. Lerco, Inc., 
610 P.2d 1307, 1310 (Utah 1980) (holding plaintiff would need to rebut affidavit 
by defendant which "specifically contradict [ed]" plaintiffs allegations). The Utah | 
Supreme Court has held that a defendant must "specifically controvert" a 
plaintiffs allegations by affidavit in order for the Court not to automatically 
4 
regard the plaintiffs allegations as true. Anderson, 807 P.2d at 827 (emphasis 
added). Further, unless an evidentiary hearing is held, a plaintiff must only prove 
jurisdiction by a preponderance of the evidence at trial; prior to trial, plaintiff must * 
simply state a prima facie case for jurisdiction. Id 
Where there remain disputes in the documentary evidence offered by the 
parties, and particularly where defendants fail to specifically contest a 
jurisdictional claim, "any [such] disputes... are resolved in the plaintiffs favor." 
Neways, 950 P.2d at 422; Anderson, 807 P.2d at 827. 
Appellants specifically alleged that Appellees, who, under Utah Code Ann. 
§ 61-1-22(4) either knew or should have known of the facts giving rise to the i 
underlying securities violations by LES and its agents, were liable as controlling 
persons of individuals or entities liable under Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-1(2). (RA 
09-07). Section 61-1-22(4) provides that, interjHa, 
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(a) Every person who directly or indirectly controls a 
seller or buyer liable under Subsection (1), every 
partner, officer, or director of such a seller or buyer, 
every person occupying a similar status or performing 
similar functions, every employee of such a seller or 
buyer who materially aids in the sale or purchase, and 
every broker-dealer or agent who materially aids in the 
sale are also liable jointly and severally with and to the 
same extent as the seller or purchaser, unless the 
nonseller or nonpurchaser who is so liable sustains the 
burden of proof that he did not know, and in exercise 
of reasonable care could not have known, of the 
existence of the facts by reason of which the liability is 
alleged to exist. 
Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-22(4) (emphasis added). By its plain language, this statute 
imposes personal liability on directors and officers of an entity liable under section 
61-1-1(2) unless they establish that they were unaware of and had no reasonable 
grounds to believe in the existence of the facts giving rise to liability. Id. 
Plaintiffs-Appellants argued that absent the required showing by the 
Defendants-Appellees under section 61-1-22(4) that they did not and could not 
have known of the facts giving rise to liability both of the selling entity and 
several of the officers and directors under section 61-1-1(2), Defendants-Appellees 
were presumed to have undertaken acts which, having effects in the state of Utah, 
are sufficient to confer personal jurisdiction over them. (RA 0578, p. 16; RA 
0731-0728). Such acts include but are not limited to controlling, managing or 
directing LES and its agents to make material misstatements in connection with 
the sale of securities in violation of section 61-1-1(2). Id. 
Defendants-Appellees did not make the required showing under section 61-
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i 
1-22(4) that they did not know or could not reasonably have known of the facts 
giving rise to violations of section 61-1-1(2) by LES or its agents. (RA 027-024, ( 
032-028, 037-033, 0164-0162, 0167-0165, 0170-0168, 0173-0171, 0176-0174, 
0179-0177). Rather, Defendants-Appellees, relying on cases which did not 
i 
implicate the specific language of section 61-1-22(4), argued generally that there 
is no per se rule of "vicarious" liability of officers and directors of a corporation 
against whom common law fraud or negligence is alleged, and that the court could ^ 
not obtain personal jurisdiction over such officers and directors based on their 
mere status as officers and directors alone. (See, e.g., RA 0146-0145, 0297-0296) 
(citing, e.g., Ten Mile Indus. Park v. Western Plains Serv. Corp., 810 F. 2d 1518, 
1527 (10th Cir. 1987); SII Megadiamond, Inc., 969 P.2d at 430). In effect, 
Defendants-Appellees argued, and the trial court agreed, that notwithstanding the 
clear statutory language of section 61-1-22(4) setting the burden of proof on the 
corporate officers and directors to show that they did not or could not have known 4 
of the facts giving rise to liability under Utah's securities laws, Plaintiffs-
Appellants were required to set forth some affirmative culpable conduct on the 
part of those officers and directors in the state of Utah in order to establish 
personal jurisdiction over them. This result conflicts squarely with the language 
and intent of section 61-1 -22(4). Section 61-1 -22(4) provides for personal liability < 
of the individuals who control and direct the commission of securities violations, 
and thereby the personal (rather than "vicarious") commission of "tortious acts" in 
or causing effects in Utah. 
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B. Appellants' Factual Allegations and Claims for Relief Under 
Utah's Securities Laws Establish That Appellees Committed a 
Tort Within or Caused Effects in Utah, 
There are three basic facts which are grounds for personal jurisdiction in 
this instance that are undisputed: (1) securities were issued or caused to be issued 
in Utah by LES; (2) these securities were offered and sold to Appellants by way of 
false or misleading statements; and (3) Appellees were directors and officers of 
LES at the time of the Issuance. (RA 026-01, 0747-0742). In this case, 
Appellants' as-pleaded legal and factual claims, along with the specific language 
of the statutes cited, together work to confer personal jurisdiction over Appellees 
in Utah. In short, Appellees bear the burden of proving that they are not liable as 
control persons under the Utah securities laws. Absent doing so - involving 
factual inquiry which would be premature at this stage of the proceedings -
Defendants-Appellees must be presumed to have committed knowing acts within 
or having effects in Utah, including but not limited to directing LES' activities in 
connection with the Issuance. Sections 61-1-22(4) and 61-1-26 make this far from 
an anomalous or unexpected result, given the precise language of these statutes, as 
well as the sheer prevalence of nearly identical provisions adapted from the 
Uniform Securities Act among the "Blue Sky Laws" of the various states. See 
discussion at Section V.C, infra; see also Uniform Securities Act §§ 605, 606 
(1985) (amended 1988). As such, personal jurisdiction over these Appellees in 
Utah is proper, and Appellees' motions to dismiss the Complaint should be denied. 
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The Utah Securities Statutes Provide For the Personal 
Liability of Corporate Officers and Directors Unless They 
Had No Knowledge of or Reason to Know of the 
Securities Violations. 
As the self-described "Executive Officers and Directors" of LES at the time 
of the Issuance , Appellees are presumptively jointly and severally liable for 
violations of Utah's securities laws arising from the issuance of securities initiated 
by LES.9 (RA 0682). This liability attaches without affirmative proof by 
Plaintiffs-Appellants of the Defendants' culpable conduct or participation in the 
alleged fraud. See Steenblik v. Lichfield, 906 P.2d 872, 876 (Utah 1995) (holding 
that the Utah securities laws "expressly imposfel... liability on every partner, 
officer, director, or the like" and that "[t]he plaintiff need not demonstrate that 
such a person was able to control the transaction" in order to establish liability) 
(emphasis added). 
Section 61-1-1 of the Utah Code provides: 
It is unlawful for any person, in connection with the 
offer, sale, or purchase of any security, directly or 
indirectly to: 
(1) employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud; 
(2) make any untrue statement of a material fact or to 
omit to state a material fact necessary in order to make 
the statements made, in the light of the circumstances 
under which they are made, not misleading; or 
(3) engage in any act, practice, or course of business 
8
 Minus Wrenn (see FN 6). 
9
 As noted above, Appellants have also pleaded violations of common law 
fraud and negligent misrepresentation, along with direct violations of Utah Code 
Ann. § 61-1-1(2), against Appellees. 
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which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit 
upon any person. 
Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-1. Section 61-1-22 provides plaintiffs with civil remedies, 
including damages and/or rescission, against persons or entities liable under 
Section 61-1-1(2). Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-22(1). Section 61-1-22(4), as stated 
above, provides for the joint and several liability of "every officer or director" of a 
person or entity so liable, unless these individuals meet their burden of proving 
that they "did not know, and in exercise of reasonable care could not have known, 
of the existence of the facts by reason of which the liability is alleged to exist." 
Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-22(4). 
As set forth supra, the Issuance underlying Plaintiffs-Appellants Complaint 
originated in Utah, and was initiated by LES to finance the construction of several 
hazardous waste facilities in Utah. (RA 0639). LES incorporated financial 
statements in the offering documents, relied upon by Appellants, which 
subsequently by the Company's own admission suffered from material 
misstatements caused by "accounting irregularities." (RA 017, 0610-0608). 
Appellants set forth in the Complaint that liability under Utah's securities laws 
could attach to LES. (RA 09). 
Appellants thus have alleged facts sufficient to state a claim against LES 
under Utah Code Ann. §§ 61-1-1(2) and 61-1-22(1). It follows that they have also 
alleged facts sufficient to state a claim against Appellees as control persons under 
252224.2 
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section 61-1-22/ See Steenblik, 906 P.2d at 876. Other states interpreting 
statutes identical to Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-22(4) agree. See, e.g., Kamen v. * 
Lindly, 94 Cal. App. 4th 197, 204 (2001) (noting that Cal. Corp. Code § 25504 
"specifically impose[s] liability not only on the buyer or seller of a security but.on 
controlling persons...as well as aiders and abettors...[thus] indicating] that the 
Legislature knows how to establish secondary liability when it wants to do so"). 
a. Other States Agree On Their Interpretation of I 
Analogous Control Person Provisions, 
States which, like Utah, have enacted provisions borrowed from the 
Uniform Securities Act and directly analogous to Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-22(4) i 
have held that the straightforward language of these statutes provides a 
presumption of the knowing commission of a tort by the officers and directors of 
an entity liable for securities fraud. 
10
 It is not necessary for Appellants to have actually pursued LES as a 
defendant in order to seek recovery against Appellees as jointly and severally 
liable parties. It is well established in the securities context that injured parties 
may seek recovery from persons or entities who may be jointly and severally 
liable with an absent party, particularly when the absent party is bankrupt. 
Courtney v. Waring, 191 Cal. App. 3d 1434, 1441 (1987) (holding that courts have 
"consistently rejected" arguments shielding "secondary parties" from liability 
when "the literal seller" of securities has never been held liable or has been 
voluntarily dismissed from the lawsuit). Indeed, in such instances, "[i]t is 
established that the plaintiff need not proceed against the principal perpetrator, nor 
need the principal perpetrator be identified in the complaint." Securities and 
Exchange Com'n v. Savoy Industries, 587 F.2d 1149, 1170 n. 47 (D.C. Cir. 1978). 
This policy seeks to prevent "officers and directors of a bankrupt corporation 
whose actions are alleged to have contributed to that condition" from "avoiding] 
... possible ... liability by asserting the lack of a prior adjudication against the 
controlled person as a basis for dismissal." Courtney, 191 Cal. App. 3d at 1442 
(citing Briggs v. Sterner, 529 F. Supp. 1155, 1171 (S.D. Iowa 1981)). 
- 2 1 -
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In Goelitz v. Lathrop et aL 3 N.E. 2d 305 (111. App. Ct. 1936)), the court 
analyzed the language of a statute analogous to section 61-1-22(4) and observed: 
When the act was amended to include "officers and 
directors of the seller," in our opinion, they were not 
only placed in the same grammatical category "as the 
seller," but we think that it was contemplated that 
liability should attach to them in the event of the sale 
of stock in violation of the Blue Sky Law by reason of 
their presumed knowledge of such sale. 
Id. at 314. The Court continued "[i]f it had been the purpose of the Legislature to 
simply add 'the officers and directors of the seller' to the group.. .who could only 
be held liable if they had 'knowingly performed any act or in any way furthered 
such sale,' it would have been an easy matter to have had the statute...[further] 
amended" to read that way. Id. By shifting the burden of proof on the officers 
and directors state of knowledge to those officers and directors, the statute 
"cure[d] what had been discovered by experience to be a fatal weakness" of the 
alternative which had "afforded officers and directors of corporations whose 
securities were illicitly sold an avenue of escape from liability on the pretext of 
ignorance" of the particular violation. IcL at 315; see also Boddy v. Theiling, 129 
Ga. App. 273 (Ga. App. 1973) (holding director's "do-nothing defense is not 
legally sufficient" to defeat plaintiff's claim). 
Utah's section 61-1-22(4) has been written even more broadly, requiring 
officers and directors of a violating entity to prove their lack of knowledge of "the 
existence of facts by reason of which the liability is alleged to exist." Utah Code 
Ann. § 61-1-22(4). In the present instance, such language necessarily 
-22-
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encompasses not only the facts pertaining simply to the Issuance itself, but also to 
the accounting irregularities which took place giving rise to the material ^ 
misrepresentations incorporated in the offering documents accompanying the 
Issuance. 
2. Closely Analogous State and Federal Provisions Have 
Been Held to Require Defendants to Bear the Burden of 
Proof Against the Presumption of Liability as Control 
Persons. I 
Though there are few decisions in Utah directly discussing presumptive 
liability under section 61-1-22(4), other state courts have been perfectly clear in 
their reading of the identically-worded "secondary liability provisions" of similar 
laws. See, e ^ , Courtney v. Waring, 191 Cal. App. 3d 1434, 1440 (1987) (citing 
West's Ann. Cal. Corp. Code § 31302). One California Court of Appeal noted j 
that California's version of section 61-1-22(4), Cal. Corp. Code § 25504, "is the 
securities law analog of section 31302 in the Franchise Investment Law." Id. 
(citing 1 Marsh & Volk, Practice Under the California Securities Laws (rev. ed. 
1986) § 14.03[4][b], pp. 14-21). 
The relevant language from Cal. Corp. Code § 31302 states as follows: { 
Every person who directly or indirectly controls a 
person liable under Section 31300 or 31301, every 
partner in a firm so liable, every principal executive 
officer or director of a corporation so liable, [and] 
every person occupying a similar status or performing 
similar functions ... are also liable jointly and 
severally with and to the same extent as such person, 
unless the other person who is so liable had no 
knowledge of or reasonable grounds to believe in the 
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existence of facts by reason of which the liability is 
alleged to exist. 
Cal. Corp. Code §31302. 
Section 31302 has been read by the California courts to require precisely 
what Appellants assert is required in the present instance: proof, by Defendants-
Appellees, of their lack of knowledge or reasonable grounds to believe in the facts 
by which the underlying securities fraud is alleged to have arisen. See Eastwood 
v. Froelicbu 60 Cal. App. 3d 523, 530-53 (1976). "Lack of knowledge or 
reasonable grounds to believe is an exemption to the liability imposed on 
corporate officers [by the securities laws!.. .the burden of proof rest[s] upon fthe 
officers! to invoke the exemption." The Neptune Society Corporation, et al. v. 
Longanecker, 194 Cal. App. 3d 1233, 1248 (1987) (emphasis added). Since the 
relevant officer in Neptune Society had failed to meet this burden, the court 
affirmed judgment against her even though the record purportedly was 
"completely silent on [the defendant's] knowledge or involvement in the.. .issue 
altogether." Id. In Courtney v. Waring, plaintiffs had sought recovery from two 
vice-presidents and a director of an entity not named in the complaint but yet 
purportedly liable under section 31201 of the California Corporations Code. 
Courtney, 191 Cal. App. 3d at 1440. Holding that "while factual questions may 
arise as to the defendants' status," the court held that where, under the plain 
language of the statute, "each of the defendants [fell] within one of the statutory 
categories.. .the complaint adequately plead[ed] a cause of action under section 
252224.2 
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31302" and that, as such, "defendants [were] properly subject to suit." Id. 
(emphasis added). 
Ten years earlier, a California appellate court observed that section 31302, 
containing language "mainly lifted from section 25504 of the Corporations Code," 
mandated that "[t]hose claiming the exemption" of liability under the statute "have 
the burden of proving it.. ..[T]hey [a]re not justified in resting on the mere denials 
of their pleadings" as to the extent of their knowledge, or lack thereof, of the facts 
by reason of which liability is alleged. Eastwood, 60 Cal. App. 3d at 530-531 
(emphasis added). 
By their precise terms, California's sections 25504 and 31302 
"exempt.. .controlling persons who c.. .had no knowledge of or reasonable ground 
to believe in the existence of facts by reason of which the liability of the controlled 
person [or entity] is alleged to exist.'" Eastwood, 60 Cal. App. 3d at 531. To 
invoke their exemption under the statutes, defendants must submit "evidence" 
which "as a matter of law establishes that [they] had no such knowledge" of the 
facts by reason of which the liability of the controlled person or entity is alleged to 
exist. Id. (emphasis added). Section 61-1-22(4), which is worded virtually 
identically to Cal. Corp. Code §§ 25504 and 31302, is subject to the same analysis. 
Steenblik, 906 P. 2d at 876. 
Whether a fact has been determined "as a matter of law" is reserved for 
trial. Anderson, 807 P.2d at 827. As noted above, at this stage of the proceedings, 
"the plaintiff is only required to make a prima facie showing of personal 
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jurisdiction." Neways, Inc., 950 P.2d at 422. Appellants have set forth allegations 
and uncontested facts giving rise to claims under section 61-1-22(4), which are 
therefore sufficient to confer personal jurisdiction over Appellees. 
Cases interpreting pleadings standards and personal jurisdiction under the 
analogous federal securities laws agree. It is "not require[d] that a plaintiff 
demonstrate that a defendant is liable in order to obtain jurisdiction of him under 
this statute. That would be to put the cart before the horse. If the suit is to enforce 
a liability created by the Securities Act, the court has jurisdiction of fsicl the 
defendant wherever he may be found." San Mateo County Transit District v. 
Dearman, Fitzgerald & Roberts, Inc., 979 R2d 1356, 1358 (9th Or. 1992). This 
view goes hand-in-hand with the Ninth Circuit's "repudiation]" of the rule of 
"culpable participation." Id. (holding that "a plaintiff [is] not required to show 
culpable participation to establish that a defendant was a controlling person" under 
the federal securities laws) (emphasis in original). Reversing the district court's 
dismissal of plaintiff's allegations, the Ninth Circuit in San Mateo stated that in 
light of this "repudiation," "[t]he standard for liability" under the federal securities 
laws "is lower than the district court thought. Even lower is the standard for 
personal jurisdiction, which exists if the plaintiff makes a non-frivolous allegation 
that the defendant controlled a person liable for the fraud." Id (emphasis added).11 
11
 One District Court has disagreed with the 9th Circuit's reasoning in San 
Mateo, asserting that culpable participation of the defendant officers and directors 
must be alleged in order to obtain personal jurisdiction over them. See In re Baan 
Co. Securities Litigation, 81 F. Supp. 2d 75 (D.D.C. 2000). However, San Mateo 
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Under both state and federal law, therefore, requiring Plaintiffs-Appellants 
to present proof of Appellees' knowledge or negligence, or allowing Appellees to 
disprove knowledge at the stage of a jurisdictional motion, would turn the written 
law on its head. Notably, as discussed further infra, none of the cases cited by 
Appellees in support of their motions to dismiss, or therefore relied on by the trial 
court in granting their motions, addresses or even relates to this very problem 
arising out of the application of the state or federal securities laws. See discussion 
at Section V.B.3, infra. 
Even if the Court were to treat Appellees' submissions as motions to 
dismiss for failure to state a claim rather than for lack of personal jurisdiction, 
Defendants' Affidavits do not constitute "proof as a matter of law that they are 
exempt from section 61-1-22(4) liability. (RA 027-024, 032-028, 037-033, 0164-
0162, 0167-0165, 0170-0168, 0173-0171, 0176-0174, 0179-0177). First, such 
"proof is a matter for separate adjudication at a trial on the merits. Anderson, 
807 P.2d at 827. Second, even if their statements are accepted as true, Appellees 
do not contend that they did not or could not reasonably have known of the facts 
by which the controlled person or entity's liability arose. (RA 027-024, 032-028, 
037-033, 0164-0162, 0167-0165, 0170-0168, 0173-0171, 0176-0174, 0179-0177). 
Rather, Defendants' Affidavits are addressed to the question of whether general 
jurisdiction would have obtained over Defendants-Appellees, and do not address 
remains applicable law in the Ninth Circuit, and there is no circuit-level authority 
in either the District of Columbia or the Tenth Circuit contradicting it. 
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statutory liability and defenses under Utah's securities laws at all. Id. 
Specifically, none of Appellees claim - let alone prove - that they did not know or 
could not reasonably have known of the facts by reason of which LES' liability 
may have come to exist under Utah's securities laws. Id. Instead, Appellees 
testify generally to their lack of personal participation in the Issuance, as well as 
their lack of residence in Utah. Id Moreover, a generalized "good faith" defense, 
including that "the controlling person.. .did not, directly or indirectly, induce the 
act, omission, or transaction constituting the violation" is not sufficient to exempt 
officers and directors from section 61-1-22(4). Compare Utah Code Ann. §61-1-
22(4) (specifically omitting this language from the Uniform Securities Act) with 
Uniform Securities Act § 605(d) (1985) (amended 1988). 
3. Appellees' Presumed Activities or Omissions Occurring in 
or Causing Effects in Utah Confer Specific Personal 
Jurisdiction Over Them In This Matter 
Contrary to Defendants-Appellees' arguments before the trial court, 
Appellants did not rely on a loose theory that personal jurisdiction over Appellees 
could obtain based on their "vicarious liability" for the wrongs of the Company, or 
their mere status as officers and directors of a corporation, without more. See, 
e.g., RA 0441 (arguing against any "attempt to attribute LES's actions to" 
Appellees); RA 0350 (citing SII Megadiamond, 969 P.2d at 437); RA 0363 (citing 
Ten Mile Indus. Park v. Western Plains Serv. Corp., 810 F.2d 1518, 1527 (10th 
Cir. 1987) (holding that jurisdiction over officers and directors "may not be 
predicated on jurisdiction over the corporation itself alone)). Rather, by virtue of 
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i 
Appellees' liability under the specific statutory language of section 61-1-22(4), 
Appellants argued that Appellees themselves had committed direct acts or • 
omissions in Utah or having effects in Utah (with respect to the discharge of their 
duties and responsibilities as an officer or director of a corporate entity) which
 m 
justified exercising personal jurisdiction over them in a Utah proceeding. (RA 
0578, p. 15-16). 
One state court has held that "if a corporate officer may be held personally 
responsible for causing the corporation to act, that act may be imputed to the 
officer for purposes of establishing personal jurisdiction over him." Seagate | 
Technology v. A.J. Kogyo, Co., 219 Cal. App. 3d 696, 703 (1990) (emphasis 
added). This is precisely what section 61-1-22(4) accomplishes - by shifting the 
i 
burden of proof as to an officer's and director's knowledge (or lack thereof) of the 
facts by reason of which the underlying liability is alleged, the statute presumes 
the "joint and several" liability of that officer or director as a control person of the ^ 
liable entity. Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-22(4). Under this reasoning, the acts or 
omissions of the Company may be imputed to each and every one of the officers 
and directors for the purpose of establishing personal jurisdiction over them, 
because section 61-1-22(4) incorporates the presumption that the directors and 
officers caused the corporation to act as it did. See Ten Mile Indus. Park, 810 F.2d 
at 1527 (holding that jurisdiction "must be based on [defendants'] individual 
contacts with the forum state.") i 
Defendants-Appellees did not address the express language of section 61-1-
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22(4), however, nor did they cite any cases in which this section was implicated. 
Instead, Defendants-Appellees offered cases for the proposition that "vicarious 
liability" may not attach to the officers and directors of a corporation, and that 
only evidence of their culpable conduct or omissions giving rise to a cause of 
action may undergird the court's personal jurisdiction over them. See generally 
RA 0296-0295 (citing SII Megadiamond, 969 P.2d at 437); RA 0146-0145 (citing, 
e.g., Ten Mile Indus. Park, 810 F.2d at 1527 ("jurisdiction over the representatives 
of a corporation may not be predicated on jurisdiction over the corporation 
itself')); RA 086-085 (same). 
None of the cases which Defendants-Appellees cited, and on which the trial 
court apparently relied, considered a statute such as Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-22(4), 
which explicitly provides for the liability of officers and directors based precisely 
on the presumption that such officers and directors acted wrongfully in their 
control of a liable entity. Id. Rather, these cases involved, inter alia, (1) an 
attempt by plaintiffs to sue individual officers of out of state company for breach 
of contract and failure to pay invoices (SII Megadiamond, 969 P.2d at 436); and 
(2) a suit against an out-of-state corporation and its officers for breach of a loan 
contract, fraud, and negligence — i.e., not for securities fraud violations (Ten Mile 
Indus. Park, 810 F.2d at 1521). 
In fact, the exact language of several closely analogous cases supports the 
exercise of personal jurisdiction over Appellees, when section 61-1-22(4) and its 
specific presumption of personal liability as to the officers and directors of an 
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entity liable for securities fraud enters the equation. See, e.g., Seagate 
Technology, 219 Cal. App. 3d at 703 ("if a corporate officer may be held 
personally responsible for causing the corporation to act, that act may be imputed 
to the officer for purposes of establishing personal jurisdiction over him"); United 
States Ins. Liab. Co. v. Haidinger-Haves, Inc., 1 Cal. 3d 586, 595 (1970) 
("Directors or officers of a corporation do not incur personal liability for torts of 
the corporation merely by reason of their official position, unless they participate 
in the wrong or authorize or direct that it be done"). Where section 61-1-22(4) 
explicitly provides for the personal liability of corporate officers and directors as 
control persons at the pleadings stage, thereby imputing the corporation's acts to 
them individually as control persons, these analogous cases directly support the 
exercise of personal jurisdiction over these Appellees. 
Defendants-Appellees transactions of business in this state provide the 
basis for asserting specific personal jurisdiction over them, whether it be their 
presumed activities controlling or directing LES and its agents in the Issuance, or 
their contracting in this state, through an agent, for a loan (the Loan Agreement) 
securing the Issuance valued at over $45 million. It is immaterial whether 
Defendants-Appellees themselves have ever contacted the state. See Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-27-24 (applying to persons "whether or not a citizen or resident of this 
state, who in person or through an agent" transacts business in the state or 
contracts here). LES initiated the Issuance in Utah and could reasonably have 
been held liable for violation of Utah's securities laws for selling or offering to sell 
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securities in this state by way of material misrepresentations as to its financial 
results. (RA 0643-0610, 09). LES's C.F.O. at the time, Paul Humphreys, signed 
the loan agreement securing the $45 million Issuance. Id. Section 25504 provides 
for the joint and several liability of officers and directors of an entity so liable, 
presuming their knowledge and control over the entity's unlawful acts. Utah Code 
Ann. § 61-1-22(4)). Hence, Appellants have adequately alleged that Appellees 
engaged in "activities of a non-resident person, his agents, or representatives in 
this state which affect persons or businesses within the state of Utah" sufficient to 
permit the exercise of personal jurisdiction over them. Harnischfeger Engineers, 
Inc., 883 F. Supp. at 612. 
C. Personal Jurisdiction Over Appellees for Their Violations of 
Utah Securities Law Is Reasonable and Comports with Due 
Process. 
In response to a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, a 
plaintiff must present facts demonstrating that the conduct of defendants related to 
the pleaded causes is such as to constitute constitutionally cognizable "minimum 
contacts" justifying the exercise of personal jurisdiction. Miner v. Rubin & 
Fiorella, LLC, 242 F. Supp. 2d 1043, 1045 (D. Utah 2003). The undisputed facts 
recited above, together with section 61-1-22(4), establish for pleading purposes the 
knowing or negligent conduct of Appellees having effects in Utah in violation of 
Utah's securities laws. SteenbUk, 906 P.2d at 876. Further, as discussed below, 
section 61-1-26 of the Utah Code by its express language effectively gives 
jurisdiction to the Utah courts in connection with any violation of section 61-1-
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22(4) over a corporate officer or director "whether or not he has filed a consent to 
service of process.. .and personal jurisdiction over him cannot otherwise be 
obtained in this state." Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-26. 
Appellees bear the burden of demonstrating that such personal jurisdiction 
would be "unreasonable" - i.e., whether it comports with "traditional notions of 
fair play and substantial justice." International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 
310(1945). Further, 
.. .where a defendant who purposefully has directed his 
activities at forum residents seeks to defeat 
jurisdiction, he must present a compelling case that the 
presence of some other considerations would render 
jurisdiction unreasonable....[I]n undertaking interstate 
business, [a defendant] must recognize and 
accommodate... the probability and necessity of 
litigating in foreign forums. 
SII Megadiamond, 969 P.2d at 436 (citing Burger King, 471 U.S. at 477; 
Synergetics, 701 P.2d at 1111). 
In determining reasonableness of jurisdiction, Courts look to the 
"foreseeability" of a defendant's "being haled into court" in the relevant 
jurisdiction as a result of the defendant's alleged conduct and contacts with the 
forum state. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 
(1980). Courts may also weigh the interests of the forum state and plaintiff's 
interest in obtaining relief. Harnischfeger Engineers, Inc., 883 F. Supp. at 615-
616. 
Appellees cannot reasonably contend that it was unforeseeable that they 
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could be sued in the state of Utah for securities violations in this state. Forty-two 
of the fifty states have enacted control person liability provisions incorporating 
language identical or nearly identical to Utah Code Ann. §61-1-22(4). Further, 
Utah, along with over thirty other states, has enacted provisions for securing both 
service of process and personal jurisdiction over out-of-state defendants against 
whom liability under the state's Blue Sky Laws has been alleged. Utah Code 
12
 Ala. § 8-6-19 (2002); Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 444999(B) (West 2002); 
Ark. Code Ann. § 23-42-106(c) (1987-2001); Alaska Stat. § 45.55.930(c) (1962-
2001); Cal. Corp. Code § 25504; Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 11-51-604(5) (West 
2002); Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 36b-29(c) (West 2002); Del. Code Ann. tit. 6, 
§ 7323(b) (1975-2001); D.C. Code Ann. § 31-5607.06.05(c) (2002); Ga. Code 
Ann. § 10-5-14(c) (2002); Idaho Code § 30-1446(2) (Matthew-Bender 1948-
2002); Ind. Code Ann. § 23-2-l-19(d) (West 2002); Iowa Code Ann. § 502.609(2) 
(West 2002); Kan. Stat. Ann. § 17-1268(b) (2002); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. 
§ 292.480(4) (West 2002); La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 51:714 (West 2002); Me. Rev. 
Stat. tit. 32, § 10605(3) (West 2002); Md. Code Ann. Corporations and 
Associations, § 11-703(c) (West 2002); Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 110A § 410(b) 
(West 2002); Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 451.810(b) (West 2002); Minn. Stat. 
Ann. § 80A.27.3 (West 2002); Miss. Code Ann. § 75-71-719 (West 2002); Mo. 
Ann. Stat. § 409.411(c) (West 2002); Mont. Code Ann. § 30-10-307(2) (2001); 
Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 90.660(4) (West 2002); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 421-
B:25(III) (West 2002); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 49:3-71(d) (West 2002); N.M. Stat. Ann. 
§ 58-13B-40(F) (1978-2001); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 78A-56(c) (West 2002); Okla. 
Stat. Ann. tit. 71, § 408 (West 2002); Or. Rev. Stat. § 59.115(3) (2001); Pa. Stat. 
Ann. tit. 70, § l-503(a) (West 2002); R.I. Gen. Laws § 7-11-605(d) (1953-2001); 
S.C. Code Ann. § 35-1-1500 (2002); S.D. Codified Laws § 47-31A-410(c) (1968-
2002); Tenn. Code Ann. § 48-2-122(g) (West 2002); Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. 
§ 581-33(F) (West 2002); Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 9, § 4240(f) (2001); Va. Code Ann. 
§ 13.1-522(c) (West 2002); Wash. Rev. Code § 21.20.430(3) (West 2002); W. Va. 
Code § 32-4-410(b) (1966-2002); Wis. Stat. Ann. § 551.59(4) (West 2002); Wyo. 
Stat. § 17-4-122(6) (1977-2001). 
13
 The following statutes incorporate language nearly identical to section 
61-1-26, permitting personal jurisdiction over non-residents whose conduct 
violates the state's securities laws: Alaska Stat. § 45.55.980(h) (1962-2001); Ark. 
Code Ann. § 23-42-107(b) (1987-2001); Cal. Corp. Code § 25550; Conn. Gen. 
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Ann. § 61-1-26 (discussed infra). Both of these statutes are patterned after similar 
provisions in the Uniform Securities Act, which was first recommended for 
adoption by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws 
and the ABA in August of 1956, and were themselves first adopted in Utah shortly 
thereafter. See, e.g. Uniform Securities Act §§ 605, 606 (1985) (amended 1988); 
Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-1 et seq. 
At a minimum, it conforms with fair play and substantial justice for 
Appellees, as officers and directors of the entity that initiated the issuance of over 
$45 million worth of securities in Utah, to bear the burden of proving that they did 
not and reasonably could not have known of the facts surrounding LES's alleged 
liability, including the accounting fraud giving rise to material misstatements in 
the Issuance. The parties are long from the trial stage, and Appellees are not 
currently under any threat of judgment being entered against them; rather, 
Stat. Ann. § 36b-33(h) (West 2002); Del. Code Ann. tit. 6, § 7327 (1975-2001); 
D.C. Code Ann. § 31-5607.06(c) (2002); Iowa Code Ann. § 502.609(2) (West 
2002); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 292.430(3) (West 2002); Md. Code Ann. 
Corporations and Associations, § ll-802(b) (West 2002); Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. 
ch. 110A § 414(h) (West 2002); Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 451.814(h) (West 
2002); Minn. Stat. Ann. § 80A.27.8 (West 2002); Miss. Code Ann. § 75-71-703 
(West 2002); Mo. Ann. Stat. § 409.415(h) (West 2002); Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. 
90.770(4) (West 2002); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 421-B:30(VIII) (West 2002); N.J. 
Stat. Ann. § 49:3-73(b) (West 2002); N.M. Stat. Ann. § 58-13B-50(C) (1978-
2001); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 78A-63(g) (West 2002); N.D. Cent. Code § 10-04-14(2) 
(Matthew Bender 1999-2001); Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 71, § 413 (West 2002); R.I. 
Gen. Laws § 7-ll-708(c) (1953-2001); S.C. Code Ann. § 35-1-1420 (2002); S.D. 
Codified Laws § 47-31A-414 (1968-2002); Tenn. Code Ann. § 48-2-124 (West 
2002); Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 9, § 4236 (2001); W. Va. Code § 32-4-414(h) (1966-
2002); Wis. Stat. Ann. § 553.73 (West 2002); Wyo. Stat. § 17-4-126 (1977-2001). 
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Appellants are simply demanding their day in court, in order for the fact-finder to 
have an opportunity to examine any "proof to be submitted by Appellees in 
support of their exemption from section 61-1-22(4). Utah's interest in the matter 
is highlighted by its enactment of a provision expressly providing for service of 
process and personal jurisdiction over non-resident defendants who may be liable 
for state securities law violations (Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-26), as well as the Utah 
Supreme Court's observation that Utah's securities laws "deviate from" their 
federal securities law analogs "by expressly imposing liability on every partner, 
officer, director, or the like." Steenblik, 906 P.2d at 876. 
1. Section 61-1-26 of the Utah Code Grants Utah Courts 
Personal Jurisdiction to Enforce the Securities Laws, 
Without a means of acquiring jurisdiction over those who violate Utah's 
securities laws, the laws would be nothing more than an empty threat. Instead, the 
Utah legislature in enacting section 61-1-26 of the Utah Code recognized the 
national nature of the securities markets and the common situation where a 
defendant acts outside of Utah, in violation of Utah's securities laws, and causes 
an effect within the state's borders. Section 61-1-26 directly addresses this 
situation and enables the state to obtain jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant 
in a manner consistent with federal constitutional due process requirements. 
Utah Code Ann. § 61-l-26(8)(a) provides as follows: 
When any person, including any nonresident of this 
state, engages in conduct prohibited or made 
actionable by this chapter or any rule or order 
hereunder, and he has not filed a consent to service of 
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process ... and personal jurisdiction over him cannot 
otherwise be obtained in this state, that conduct shall 
be considered equivalent to his appointment of the 
division or the director to be his attorney to receive 
service of any lawful process in any noncriminal suit, 
action, or proceeding against him or his successor 
executor or administrator which grows out of that 
conduct and which is brought under this chapter or any 
rule or order hereunder, with the same force and 
validity as if served on him personally. 
(emphasis added). As noted supra, the equivalent of section 61-1-26 has been 
adopted by more than thirty of the fifty states. See FN 13. 
This section, as made clear by its express language, sets forth "a special 
means of brining into court one who violates the Securities Act," to be used 
"[w]hen personal jurisdiction over [the defendant] cannot otherwise be obtained." 
Piantes v. Hayden-Stone, Inc., 514 P.2d 529 (Utah 1973). It enables a plaintiff to 
avoid the inconvenience and expense that might be encountered in having to sue 
different defendants involved in the same scheme in different jurisdictions or, in 
the case of a resident plaintiff, in having to pursue claims in a foreign jurisdiction. 
See id. Other states have interpreted their analogous statutes to ensure that their 
courts will be able to hear and adjudicate claims brought under their securities 
laws, since a "foreign court may not be as hospitable to the enforcement of a 
[state's] Securities Law as [that state's] court would be." See, e.g., Marsh & Volk, 
California Securities Laws, § 14.12[2], at 14-76. 
In a case that is directly on point, Massachusetts has interpreted this same 
provision in a Massachusetts' statute, M.G.L. 110A § 414(h), as extending 
252224.2 
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jurisdiction over an individual who claimed that he had done no act and had 
engaged in no conduct within the jurisdiction of the state. The court found that 
because the individual defendant was charged with liability for his acts or inaction 
under the state's controlling person liability statute, the equivalent of Utah's 
section 61-1-22(4), he had engaged in conduct prohibited or made actionable by 
the state's securities laws such that the court could exercise jurisdiction over him 
pursuant to M.G.L. 110A § 414(h). See American Microtel, Inc. v. Massachusetts, 
1995 WL 809575, *10-11 (Mass. Super. Jan. 27, 1995). 
Further, in Brown v. Investment Management and Research, Inc., 323 S.C. 
395 (1996), the South Carolina Supreme Court interpreted a statutory provision 
identical to Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-26(8) to mean that violations of that state's 
securities provisions "as a matter of law...submitted [Appellees] to personal 
jurisdiction in South Carolina." Id. at 401. 
a. One Case Which Appears to Hold that Control 
Person Liability Under an Analogous State 
Securities Regimen Does Not Confer Jurisdiction is 
Highly Distinguishable. 
One reported case, from Kansas, ostensibly held that a control person's 
presumptive liability under a state securities law analogous to section 61-1-22(4) 
is not sufficient to confer personal jurisdiction. Schlatter v. Mo-Comm Futures, 
Ltd., 662 P.2d 553 (Kan. 1983). The trial court erroneously stated that that case 
was "exactly like" the present case. (RA 0578, p. 15). This is incorrect. Schlatter 
is distinguishable on several grounds from the present case, and even the court 
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252224.2 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
acknowledged that the question of jurisdiction in that case was "difficult." 
Schlatter, 662 P.2d at 557. In Schlatter, the jurisdictional motions were heard and 
decided at the same time as plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment. Thus, the 
court had available and considered an extensive factual record relevant to issues of 
ultimate liability in the case. With this record, the court also found that there was 
no evidence suggesting that the defendants had engaged in any conduct that would 
have brought them within Kansas' long-arm statute. Indeed, the record before the 
court showed that the defendants "were not actively engaged in any of the 
management decisions of the corporation," "did not attend any directors' 
meetings," were not "aware that the limited partnership interests were being sold 
in Kansas," and took no "steps to participate in the affairs of the corporation or to 
fulfill their duties as directors." Id. at 559. Based on this record, the court framed 
the issue: 
Does it follow that defendants, as name-only, non-
participating directors, have transacted business within 
the State of Kansas or committed a tortious act within 
the state? We think not. . . . While the defendants were 
lax in not assuming their duties as directors and in 
allowing their appointment and continuation as 
directors when they obviously had no control or say in 
the management of the corporation, we cannot say that 
such nonfeasance constitutes the doing of business or 
commission of a tortious act in Kansas... . [The 
defendants] had no contact whatsoever in connection 
with the activities of Mo-Comm Futures, Inc., in 
selling the limited partnership interests in Kansas. 
While their total failure to assume any of the duties of 
a director of Mo-Comm Futures, Inc., may constitute a 
breach of their fiduciary duty to the corporation and its 
stockholders [citation omitted], such nonfeasance in 
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office cannot be the basis of subjecting them to in 
personam jurisdiction in Kansas solely because the 
corporation transacted business or committed tortious 
acts in Kansas. 
Id. at 560-63. Under these circumstances, the court found that the defendants had 
not "acted within [the] state as a director, transacted business in Kansas, or 
committed a tortious act in Kansas . . . " Id. at 563. Importantly, Kansas' 
purported analog to Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-22(4), quoted by the Kansas Supreme 
Court in its decision, is materially different from the Utah statute in both its 
language and the scope of liability (and therefore the acts presumed to have been 
undertaken by officers and directors of a liable entity or its agents which give rise 
to personal jurisdiction). Kan. Stat. Ann. § 17-1268(b) provides, in part, that 
"every partner, officer, or director.. .who materially aids in the sale" of securities 
in violation of Kansas law is jointly and severally liable with the seller of 
securities. Schlatter, 233 Kan. at 337. Thus, the Kansas court observed, that 
though "the statute establishes the basis of liability of persons involved in the sale 
of unregistered securities,.. .it does not establish the jurisdiction of the court to 
submit such persons to liability." Id. Utah's statute is fundamentally different, in 
that it does not require that plaintiffs demonstrate that officers and directors were 
"involved in the sale" of securities, but instead places the onus on such officers 
and directors to prove that they did not know of the existence of facts giving rise 
to the underlying liability. See Steenblik, 906 P.2d at 876. 
Finally, the court's reasoning regarding jurisdiction and liability under 
252224.2 
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Kansas' control person liability statute must be limited to the circumstances of that 
case. The Schlatter court failed to review a single case discussing the requisite 
showing of "control" or standard for liability under the statute and failed to 
consider cases holding that the ability to exercise, rather than the actual exercise, 
of control is enough. McNamara v. Bre-X Minerals Ltd., 46 F. Supp. 2d 628, 638 
(E.D. Tex. 1999). Instead, the court fell back on the extensive factual record 
before it and the evidence in that record demonstrating that defendants had wholly 
abdicated all of their director duties. In addition, Kansas' securities laws lack the 
equivalent of Utah's section 61-1-26, so conduct by a non-resident that violates 
the state's securities laws is not equated with consent to be sued within the state 
and will not subject that individual to jurisdiction. See Kan. Stat. Ann. § 17-1263. 
For these reasons, the Schlatter holding conflicts with other decisions which find 
jurisdiction based on allegations of control person liability. See, e.g., McNamara, 
46 F. Supp. 2d at 628. 
2. The Interplay of the Equivalent Federal Statutes Confer 
Personal Jurisdiction in this Type of Situation. 
Federal courts confront the same jurisdictional question when determining 
whether they can exercise personal jurisdiction over foreign director and officer 
defendants whose only liability for the wrongful conduct arises out of their 
participation as "control persons." The federal control person statute, section 
20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78t(a), is analogous to 
Utah's section 61-1-22(4) - with the exception that it permits a "good faith" 
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defense to defendants, which is an easier standard for defendants to meet than that 
of the Utah statute.14 The Ninth Circuit has held that it is "clear that in an action 
based on section 20(a) (of the Securities Exchange Act), the defendant who is a 
controlling person, and not the plaintiff, bears the burden of proof as to 
defendant's good faith." Hollinger v. Titan Capital Corp., 914 F.2d 1564, 1575 
(9th Cir. 1990) (see also Howard v. Everex, 228 F.3d 1057, 1065 (9th Cir. 2000)) 
(holding that "[p]laintiff need not show that the defendant was a culpable 
participant in the violation, but defendant may assert a 'good faith' defense"). 
Like the Utah code, the federal securities laws explicitly provide for 
personal jurisdiction over defendants who are not present in the forum - which in 
the federal context, may mean the United States.15 See 15 U.S.C.A. § 78aa; see 
also Leasco Data Processing Equipment Corp. v. Maxwell, 468 F.2d 1326, 1340 
(2d Cir. 1972) (finding that Congress meant to meant to assert personal 
jurisdiction over foreigners not present in the United States to boundaries of due 
14
 Section 20(a) provides: "Every person who, directly or indirectly, 
controls any person liable under any provision of this chapter or of any rule or 
regulation thereunder shall also be liable jointly and severally with and to the same 
extent as such controlled person to any person to whom such controlled person is 
liable, unless the controlling person acted in good faith and did not directly or 
indirectly induce the act or acts constituting the violation or cause of action." 
15
 15 U.S.C.A. § 78aa provides that the district courts of the United States 
"shall have exclusive jurisdiction of violations of [the Securities Exchange] Act," 
and continues on as follows: 
"Any suit or action to enforce any liability or duty created by this Act or 
rules and regulations thereunder.. .may be brought in any such district.. .and 
process in such cases may be served in any other district of which the 
defendant is an inhabitant or wherever the defendant may be found." 
252224.2 
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. 1 
process). Thus, in determining whether personal jurisdiction can be exercised 
over a foreign defendant alleged to be liable only as a control person, federal * 
courts ask and answer the same questions as were presented to the trial court, 
regarding the necessary showing by the plaintiff and the requisite contacts ^ 
between the defendant and the forum. 
A number of federal courts which have analyzed the question of personal 
jurisdiction over foreign or non-U.S. resident defendants based on the complaint's 
allegations of control person liability under section 20(a) have found personal 
jurisdiction to exist. For instance, in McNamara, 46 F. Supp. 2d at 628, the court ( 
held that control person liability under section 20(a) automatically encompasses a 
jurisdictional inquiry and rejected the notion that it must engage in a separate 
i 
minimum contacts analysis. Id at 636. The court found that it could exercise 
personal jurisdiction over the foreign officers and directors based on plaintiffs' 
"prima facie" showing that they were control persons under the Fifth Circuit test, ' 
meaning that they "possessed the power to control [directly or indirectly] the 
specific transaction or activity upon which the primary violation is predicated," 
whether or not they exercised such power. Id. at 638. 
In Derenis v. Coopers & Lybrand Chartered Accountants, 930 F. Supp. 
1003 (D.N.J. 1996), the court held that it had personal jurisdiction over two 
foreign directors. The complaint alleged that these two defendants were directors 
and members of the audit committee and that they had reviewed and approved < 
misleading financial statements and public disclosures. The court found that these 
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allegations at the pleading stage adequately pled control person liability under the 
Third Circuit's culpable participation test - a test which actually has been rejected 
in the Ninth and Tenth Circuits as imposing an impermissible burden on plaintiffs. 
Id at 1013-14; cf. San Mateo County Transit District, 979 F.2d at 1358; San 
Francisco-Oklahoma Petroleum Exploration Corp. v. Carstan Oil Co., Inc., 765 
F.2d 962, 964-65 (10th Cir. 1985). The court also held that they constituted a 
prima facie showing that the foreign directors were controlling persons who knew 
that the allegedly misleading financial statements would affect the company's 
stock price in the United States. Id. at 1014. Jurisdiction could be properly 
exercised over them on this basis. 
Similarly, in Landry v. Price Waterhouse Chartered Accountants, 715 F. 
Supp. 98 (S.D.N.Y. 1989), the court found that it could exercise personal 
jurisdiction over a foreign director based on plaintiffs' prima facie showing that he 
was a "control person" within the meaning of section 20(a). The complaint's 
allegations of his shareholder and director status, coupled with an allegation that 
he knew or should have known that the wrongful conduct would have an impact 
on the value of the company's stock, were sufficient. IcL at 102. The court found 
that such showing satisfied due process requirements that the foreign defendant 
both caused an effect in the United States and should have reasonably anticipated 
being haled into court in the United States. Id at 101-2. 
In each of these cases, the courts equated the complaint's allegations -
regarding the foreign directors' and officers' ability to control, either directly or 
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indirectly, the corporate entity charged with violating the federal securities laws 
and without proof that such control had been exercised - with the foreign 4 
defendants' having caused an effect in the United States and having knowledge 
that the alleged wrongful corporate acts would have an effect on the corporation's 
I 
stock price in the United States. The result should be no different under Utah law. 
Appellants' allegations regarding Appellees' control person liability, coupled with 
the express language of section 61-1-22(4) of the Utah Code, should confer ^ 
personal jurisdiction over them. 
3. Granting Appellees' Motions to Dismiss Would Promote 
an Absurd Result, 
Appellees have not claimed that service of process or notice of the pending 
action was defective. Hence, one of the principal concerns of the service 
provisions - notice of the pending action - has been met. This same concern 
underlies Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-26, which was designed - along with all other 
provisions similarly modeled after the Uniform Securities Act - to provide a 
means for securing notice of the pending action where other alternatives are 
unavailable. Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-26; see also Marsh & Volk, California 4 
Securities Laws, § 14.12[2], at 14-76 (interpreting identical California statute). 
Appellees have instead moved to dismiss the Complaint based on their lack 
of substantial contacts with the state, as well as their lack of personal involvement 
in the Issuance. See RA 027-024, 032-028, 037-033, 0164-0162, 0167-0165, 
0170-0168,0173-0171,0176-0174,0179-0177. However, as noted above, such < 
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casual defenses do not meet the burden imposed by the Utah securities laws to 
exempt directors and officers from their liability as controlling persons. Prior to 
raising and proving such a defense, Appellees are presumed by the statute to have 
knowingly or negligently committed a tort having effects in this state, thereby 
satisfying the "minimum contacts" test for personal jurisdiction. Utah Code Ann. 
§ 61-1-22(4)) (see discussion in Section V.B, supra). Plaintiffs-Appellants 
expressly are not required to prove Appellees' "culpable participation" in the 
controlled person's or entity's tort in order for Appellees' knowing or negligent 
acts to be presumed. Steenblik, 906 P.2d at 876. Further, as noted above, 
Appellants have no burden to prove the truth of the allegations of Complaint 
because Appellees have not moved to dismiss the Complaint for failure to state a 
claim. Lastly, Utah's securities laws (modeled after the widely-adopted Uniform 
Securities Act) expressly provide for service of process and personal jurisdiction 
over non-resident defendants who may be liable for violating the state's securities 
statutes. Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-26. 
Granting Appellees' motions to dismiss therefore threatens to impose an 
absurd result. Requiring Appellants to submit additional evidence or declarations 
to support the uncontested facts and liability already submitted both contradicts 
the express provisions of Utah's securities statutes, and defeats the intent of these 
statutes and the Uniform Securities Act to promote full enforcement of the various 
states' securities laws and to protect the local investor. That there is so little 
caselaw directly addressing the present scenario, whereby a corporation's officers 
-46 -
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i 
and directors move to dismiss a complaint sounding in state securities law for lack 
of personal jurisdiction, may speak to the inconsistency of the reasoning employed 
by the trial court. Much more precedent exists on the question of whether 
plaintiffs such as Appellants have stated a cause of action under those or m 
analogous laws, for the purpose of deciding a demurrer or satisfying summary 
judgment. See generally Steenblik, 906 P.2d at 879; Sherman v. Lloyd, 181 Cal. 
App. 3d 693 (1986); Bowden v. Robinson, 67 Cal. App. 3d 705 (1977) (reversing 
summary judgment in favor of officers and directors); Eastwood, 60 Cal. App. 3d 
at 530-53; The Neptune Society Corporation, 194 Cal. App. 3d at 1233 (1987). I 
This fact squares with the express language of the securities statutes, which (a) 
require fact-finding into the controlling persons' knowledge or intent prior to a 
final determination of their liability under statutes such as section 61-1-22(4) and 
(b) confer personal jurisdiction over such defendants precisely in order to 
determine that question. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the trial court erred in finding that Appellees 
were not subject to personal jurisdiction in the state of Utah for their alleged 
violations of Utah's securities laws. The trial court's finding was at a minimum 
premature and inappropriate at the pleadings stage, absent complete factual 
adjudication on the extent of Appellees' knowledge of the facts giving rise to the 
liability asserted by Appellants. The judgment of the trial court should be | 
reversed, and Appellees' collective motions to dismiss the Complaint denied. 
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VII. ADDENDUM 
An Addendum is attached as pages A-1 to A-14, pursuant to Rule 24(a)(l 1) 
of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
Dated: April 25, 2003 By:_ I [)fc 
Richard M. Heimann 
Richard M. Heimann {admittedpro hac 
vice) 
LIEFF, CABRASER, HEIMANN & 
BERNSTEIN, LLP 
275 Battery Street, 30th Floor 
San Francisco, California 94111-3339 
Telephone: (415) 956-1000 
Counsel for Plaintiffs/Appellants 
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c 
UTAH CODE, 1953 
TITLE 61. SECURITIES DIVISION --REAL ESTATE DIVISION 
CHAPTER 1. UTAH UNIFORM SECURITIES ACT 
Copyright © 2002 by Matthew Bender & Company, Inc., a member of the 
LexisNexis Group. All rights reserved. 
Current through the 2002 5th Special Session 
61-1-1 Fraud unlawful. 
It is unlawful for any person, in connection with the offer, sale, or purchase of 
any security, directly or indirectly to: 
(1) employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud; 
(2) make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material 
fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the 
circumstances under which they are made, not misleading; or 
(3) engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would 
operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person. 
History: C. 1953, 61-1-1, enacted by L. 1963, ch. 145, § 1; 1983, ch. 284, § 4. 
<General Materials (GM) - References, Annotations, or Tables> 
NOTES, REFERENCES, AND ANNOTATIONS 
Repeals and Reenactments. —Sections 61-1-1 to 61-1-41 (L. 1925, ch. 87, § § 1 to 
10, lOx, 11 to 18, 20 to 27; 1927, ch. 59, § 1; 1929, ch. 79, § 1; R. S. 1933, 82-
1-1 to 82-1-41; L. 1941 (1st S. S.), ch. 29, § § 1, 2; C. 1943, 82-1-1 to 82-1-41; 
L. 1957, ch. 129, § 1; 1961, ch. 149, § 1 ) , relating to the state securities 
commission, were repealed by Laws 1963, ch. 145, § 1 (see § 61-1- 30). Present § § 
61-1-1 to 61-1-30 were enacted by § 1 of the act. 
Comparable Provisions.--Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 44-1801 et seq. 
Colo. Rev. Stat. Title 11, Art. 51. 
Idaho Code § 3 0-1401 et seq. 
New Mexico Stat. Anno. § 58-13B-1 et seq. 
Nev. Rev. Stat. Chapter 90. 
Wvo. Stat. § 17-4-101 et seq. 
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Cross-References. —Criminal Code, corporation frauds, § 76-10-701 et seq. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Expert testimony. 
Financial records. 
Finding of fraud. 
Instructions. 
Intent to defraud. 
Omission of material fact. 
Private action. 
Purpose. 
Reliance. 
Security classification. 
Sufficiency of evidence. 
Expert testimony. 
The trial court did not err in allowing a securities expert to testify as to the 
"materiality" of information defendant allegedly had omitted from securities-related 
documents, and the expert's limited use of the word "material" did not mandate the 
conclusion that he was improperly instructing the jury on the law. State v. Larsen, 
865 P.2d 1355 (Utah 1993). 
Financial records. 
Admitting a defendant's financial records in violation of the Financial 
Information Privacy Act (§ 78-27-45 et seq.) was reversible error. State v. Waite, 
803 P.2d 1279 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). 
Finding of fraud. 
Defendant's concealing from his employer, a licensed broker dealer, unauthorized 
sales of investments and his affirmative misrepresentions regarding his actions 
harmed his employer by loss of commissions and by exposure to potential lawsuits by 
disgruntled investors, and such fraud on the employer was sufficient to invoke this 
section. State v. Harry, 873 P.2d 1149 (Utah Ct. A P P . 1994). 
Instructions. 
Even though instructions outlined three possible alternative acts required for the 
crime of securities fraud and did not require jury unanimity as to a specific act, 
there was no plain error as long as each juror believed, beyond a reasonable doubt, 
that at least one prohibited act occurred. State v. Tennev, 913 P.2d 750 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1996). 
Intent to defraud. 
A scheme to defraud need not come to fruition in order to constitute a crime under 
the securities laws; the offense is complete when a device, scheme or artifice is 
used with intent to defraud. State v. Facer, 552 P.2d 110 (Utah 1976). 
The trial court properly instructed the jury that the culpable mental state for 
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UTAH CODE, 1953 
TITLE 61. SECURITIES DIVISION --REAL ESTATE DIVISION 
CHAPTER 1. UTAH UNIFORM SECURITIES ACT 
Copyright © 2002 by Matthew Bender & Company, Inc., a member of the 
LexisNexis Group. All rights reserved. 
Current through the 2002 5th Special Session 
61-1-22 Sales and purchases in violation --Remedies --Limitation of actions. 
(1) (a) A person who offers or sells a security in violation of Subsection 61-1-
3(1), Section 61-1-7, Subsection 61-1-17(2), any rule or order under Section 61-1-
15, which requires the affirmative approval of sales literature before it is used, 
any condition imposed under Subsection 61-1-10(4) or 61- 1-11(7), or offers, sells, 
or purchases a security in violation of Subsection 61-1-1(2) is liable to the person 
selling the security to or buying the security from him, who may sue either at law 
or in equity to recover the consideration paid for the security, together with 
interest at 12% per year from the date of payment, costs, and reasonable 
attorney's fees, less the amount of any income received on the security, upon the 
tender of the security or for damages if he no longer owns the security. 
(b) Damages are the amount that would be recoverable upon a tender less the 
value of the security when the buyer disposed of it and interest at 12% per year 
from the date of disposition. 
(2) The court in a suit brought under Subsection (1) may award an amount equal to 
three times the consideration paid for the security, together with interest, costs, 
and attorney's fees, less any amounts, all as specified in Subsection (1) upon a 
showing that the violation was reckless or intentional. 
(3) A person who offers or sells a security in violation of Subsection 61-1- 1(2) 
is not liable under Subsection (1)(a) if the purchaser knew of the untruth or 
omission, or the seller did not know and in the exercise of reasonable care could 
not have known of the untrue statement or misleading omission. 
(4) (a) Every person who directly or indirectly controls a seller or buyer liable 
under Subsection (1) , every partner, officer, or director of such a seller or buyer, 
every person occupying a similar status or performing similar functions, every 
employee of such a seller or buyer who materially aids in the sale or purchase, and 
every broker-dealer or agent who materially aids in the sale are also liable jointly 
and severally with and * to the same extent as the seller or purchaser, unless the 
nonseller or nonpurchaser who is so liable sustains the burden of proof that he did 
not know, and in exercise of reasonable care could not have known, of the existence 
of the facts by reason of which the liability is alleged to exist. 
(b) There is contribution as in cases of contract among the several persons so 
liable. 
(5) Any tender specified in this section may be made at any time before entry of 
judgment. 
(6) A cause of action under this section survives the death of any person who 
might have been a plaintiff or defendant. 
(7) (a) No action shall be maintained to enforce any liability under this section 
unless brought before the expiration of four years after the act or transaction 
constituting the violation or the expiration of two years after the discovery by the 
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plaintiff of the facts constituting the violation, whichever expires first. 
(b) No person may sue under this section if: 
(i) the buyer or seller received a written offer, before suit and at a time 
when he owned the security, to refund the consideration paid together with interest 
at 12% per year from the date of payment, less the amount of any income received on 
the security, and he failed to accept the offer within 30 days of its receipt; or 
(ii) the buyer or seller received such an offer before suit and at a time when 
he did not own the security, unless he rejected the offer in writing within 30 days 
of its receipt. 
(8) No person who has made or engaged in the performance of any contract in 
violation of this chapter or any rule or order hereunder, or who has acquired any 
purported right under any such contract with knowledge of the facts by reason of 
which its making or performance was in violation, may base any suit on the contract. 
(9) A condition, stipulation, or provision binding a person acquiring a security 
to waive compliance with this chapter or a rule or order hereunder is void. 
(10) (a) The rights and remedies provided by this chapter are in addition to any 
other rights or remedies that may exist at law or in equity. 
(b) This chapter does not create any cause of action not specified in this 
section or Subsection 61-1-4(6). 
History: C. 1953, 61-1-22, enacted by L. 1963, ch. 145, § 1; 1979, ch. 218, § 7; 
1983, ch. 284, § 32; 1986, ch. 107, § 2; 1990, ch. 133, § 15; 1991, ch. 161, § 
14; 1998, ch. 13, § 62. 
<General Materials (GM) - References, Annotations, or Tables> 
NOTES, REFERENCES, AND ANNOTATIONS 
Amendment Notes. --The 1998 amendment, effective May 4, 1998, substituted 
'Subsection 61-1-4(6)" for "Subsection 61-1-4(5)" in Subsection (10)(b). 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Constitutionality. 
Assignability of cause of action. 
Attorney fees. 
Bond of dealer. 
Burden of proof. 
Damages. 
Evidence. 
Foreign contracts. 
Future services. 
Laches and estoppel. 
Liability. 
Participating or aiding in sale. 
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UTAH CODE, 1953 
TITLE 61. SECURITIES DIVISION --REAL ESTATE DIVISION 
CHAPTER 1. UTAH UNIFORM SECURITIES ACT 
Copyright © 2002 by Matthew Bender & Company, Inc., a member of the 
LexisNexis Group. All rights reserved. 
Current through the 2002 5th Special Session 
61-1-26 Scope of the act --Service of process. 
(1) Section 61-1-1, Subsection 61-1-3(1), Sections 61-1-7, 61-1-15.5, 61-1- 17, 
and 61-1-22 apply to persons who sell or offer to sell when: 
(a) an offer to sell is made in this state; or 
(b) an offer to buy is made and accepted in this state. 
(2) Section 61-1-1, Subsection 61-1-3(1), and Section 61-1-17 apply to persons who 
buy or offer to buy when: 
(a) an offer to buy is made in this state; or 
(b) an offer to sell is made and accepted in this state. 
(3) For the purposes of this section, an offer to sell or to buy is made in this 
state whether or not either party is then present in this state, when the offer: 
(a) originates from this state; or 
(b) is directed by the offeror to this state and received at the place to which 
it is directed, or at any post office in this state in the case of a mailed offer. 
(4) For the purposes of this section, an offer to sell or to buy is accepted in 
this state when acceptance: 
(a) is communicated to the offeror in this state; and 
(b) has not previously been communicated to the offeror, orally or in writing, 
outside this state, and acceptance is communicated to the offeror in this state, 
whether or not either party is then present in this state, when the offeree directs 
it to the offeror in this state reasonably believing the offeror to be in this state 
and it is received at the place to which it is directed or at any post office in 
this state in the case of a mailed acceptance. 
(5) An offer to sell or to buy is not made in this state when: 
(a) the publisher circulates or there is circulated on his behalf in this state 
any bona fide newspaper or other publication of general, regular, and paid 
circulation which is not published in this state, or which is published in this 
state but has had more than 2/3 of its circulation outside this state during the 
past 12 months; or 
(b) a radio or television program originating outside this state is received in 
this state. 
(6) Section 61-1-2 and Subsection 61-1-3(3), as well as Section 61-1-17 so far as 
investment advisers are concerned, apply when any act instrumental in effecting 
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prohibited conduct is done in this state, whether or not either party is then 
present in this state. 
(7) (a) Every application for registration under this chapter and every issuer 
which proposes to offer a security in this state through any person acting on an 
agency basis in the common-law sense shall file with the division, in such form as 
it prescribes by rule, an irrevocable consent appointing the division or the 
director to be his attorney to receive service of any lawful process in any 
noncriminal suit, action, or proceeding against him or his successor, executor, or 
administrator which arises under this chapter or any rule or order hereunder after 
the consent has been filed, with the same force and validity as if served personally 
on the person filing the consent. 
(b) A person who has filed such a consent in connection with a previous 
registration or notice filing need not file another. 
(c) Service may be made by leaving a copy of the process in the office of the 
division, but it is not effective unless the plaintiff, who may be the division in a 
suit, action, or proceeding instituted by it, sends notice of the service and a copy 
of the process by registered mail to the defendant or respondent at his last address 
on file with the division, and the plaintiff's affidavit of compliance with this 
subsection is filed in the case on or before the return day of the process, if any, 
or within such further time as the court allows. 
(8) (a) When any person, including any nonresident of this state, engages in 
conduct prohibited or made actionable "by this chapter or any rule or order 
hereunder, and he has not filed a consent to service of process under Subsection (7) 
and personal jurisdiction over him cannot otherwise be obtained in this state, that 
conduct shall be considered equivalent to his appointment of the division or the 
director to be his attorney to receive service of any lawful process in any 
noncriminal suit, action, or proceeding against him or his successor executor or 
administrator which grows out of that conduct and which is brought under this 
chapter or any rule or order hereunder, with the same force and validity as if 
served on him personally. 
(b) Service may be made by leaving a copy of the process in the office of the 
division, but it is not effective unless the plaintiff, who may be the division 
in a suit, action, or proceeding instituted by it, sends notice of the service and a 
copy of the process by registered mail to the defendant or respondent at his last-
known address or takes other steps which are reasonably calculated to give actual 
notice, and the plaintiff's affidavit of compliance with this subsection is filed in 
the case on or before the return day of the process, if any, or within such further 
time as the court allows. 
(9) When process is served under this section, the court, or the director shall 
order such continuance as may be necessary to afford the defendant or respondent 
reasonable opportunity to defend. 
History: C. 1953, 61-1-26, enacted by L. 1963, ch. 145, § 1; 1983, ch. 284, § 36; 
1990, ch. 133, § 17; 1992, ch. 216, § 6; 1997, ch. 160, § 11. 
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Amendment Notes. --The 1997 amendment, effective May 5, 1997, inserted "61-1-
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UTAH CODE, 1953 
TITLE 78, JUDICIAL, CODE 
PART III, Procedure 
CHAPTER 27, MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS 
Copyright © 2002 by Matthew Bender & Company, Inc., a member of the 
LexisNexis Group. All rights reserved. 
Current through the 2002 5th Special Session 
78-27-22 Jurisdiction over nonresidents --Purpose of provision. 
It is declared, as a matter of legislative determination, that the public interest 
demands the state provide its citizens with an effective means of redress against 
nonresident persons, who, through certain significant minimal contacts with this 
state, incur obligations to citizens entitled to the state's protection. This 
legislative action is deemed necessary because of technological progress which has 
substantially increased the flow of commerce between the several states resulting in 
increased interaction between persons of this state and persons of other states. 
The provisions of this act, to ensure maximum protection to citizens of this 
state, should be applied so as to assert jurisdiction over nonresident defendants to 
the fullest extent permitted by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 
to the United States Constitution. 
History: L. 1969, ch. 246, § 1. 
NOTES, REFERENCES, AND ANNOTATIONS 
Meaning of 'this act*. --The term "this act," in the second paragraph, means Laws 
1969, ch. 246, which enacted § § 78-27-22 to 78-27-28. 
Cross-References. --Foreign corporations, registered office and agent, § 16- 10a-
1508. 
Foreign fraternals, service of process upon commissioner, § 31A-14-203. 
Nonresident motorists, long-arm provision, § 41-12a-403. 
Service of process, Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 4. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Implementation. 
Minimum contacts. 
Transacting business. 
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UTAH CODE, 1953 
TITLE 78. JUDICIAL CODE 
PART III. Procedure 
CHAPTER 27. MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS 
Copyright © 2002 by Matthew Bender & Company, Inc., a member of the 
LexisNexis Group. All rights reserved. 
Current through the 2002 5th Special Session 
78-27-23 Jurisdiction over nonresidents --Definitions. 
As used in this act: 
(1) The words "any person" mean any individual, firm, company, association, or 
corporation. 
(2) The words "transaction of business within this state" mean activities of' a 
nonresident person, his agents, or representatives in this state which affect 
persons or businesses within the state of Utah. 
History: L. 1969, ch. 246, § 2. 
NOTES, REFERENCES, AND ANNOTATIONS 
Meaning of 'this act'. --See note following same catchline in notes to § 78- 27-
22. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Nonresident plaintiff. 
Transaction of business. 
Cited. 
Nonresident plaintiff. 
Foreign corporation lawfully authorized to do business in the state of Utah is a 
business within the state of Utah and entitled to the protection of § § 78- 27-22 
to 78-27-28. Hughes Tool Co. v. Meier, 486 F.2d 593 (10th Cir. 1973). 
Transaction of business. 
The long-arm statute grants personal jurisdiction over claims arising out of any 
business transaction within the state, regardless of whether it is related to the 
Copr. © West 2003 No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
UT ST § 78-27-24 
U.C.A. 1953 § 78-27-24 
Page 2 
G 
UTAH CODE, 1953 
TITLE 78. JUDICIAL CODE 
PART III» Procedure 
CHAPTER 27, MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS 
Copyright © 2002 by Matthew Bender & Company, Inc., a member of the 
LexisNexis Group. All rights reserved. 
Current through the 2002 5th Special Session 
78-27-24 Jurisdiction over nonresidents --Acts submitting person to jurisdiction. 
Any person, notwithstanding Section 16-10a-1501, whether or not a citizen or 
resident of this state, who in person or through an agent does any of the following 
enumerated acts, submits himself, and if an individual, his personal representative, 
to the jurisdiction of the courts of this state as to any claim arising out of or 
related to: 
(1) the transaction of any business within this state; 
(2) contracting to supply services or goods in this state; 
(3) the causing of any injury within this state whether tortious or by breach of 
warranty; 
(4) the ownership, use, or possession of any real estate situated in this state; 
(5) contracting to insure any person, property, or risk located within this 
state at the time of contracting; 
(6) with respect to actions of divorce, separate maintenance, or child support, 
having resided, in the marital relationship, within this state notwithstanding 
subsequent departure from the state; or the commission in this state of the act 
giving rise to the claim, so long as that act is not a mere omission, failure to 
act, or occurrence over which the defendant had no control; or 
(7) the commission of sexual intercourse within this state which gives rise to a 
paternity suit under Title 78, Chapter 45a, to determine paternity for the purpose 
of establishing responsibility for child support. 
History: L. 1969, ch. 246, § 3; 1983, ch. 160, § 1; 1987, ch. 35, § 1; 1992, ch. 
277, § 247; 1998, ch. 120, § 1. 
NOTES, REFERENCES, AND ANNOTATIONS 
Amendment Notes. — T h e 1998 amendment, effective May 4, 1998, substituted 
"arising out of or related to" for "arising from" at the end of the introductory 
paragraph. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
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CORPORATIONS CODE 
TITLE 4. SECURITIES 
DIVISION 1. CORPORATE SECURITIES LAW OF 1968 
PART 6, ENFORCEMENT 
CHAPTER 1. CIVIL LIABILITY 
Copr. © West Group 2003. All rights reserved. 
Current through Ch. 3 of 2003-04 Reg.Sess. urgency legislation, 
Ch. 4 of 1st Ex.Sess. urgency legislation, & Ch. 1 of 2nd Ex.Sess. 
§ 25504. Joint and several liability of other persons, partners, etc., with persons liable under section 25501 or 25503 
Every person who directly or indirectly controls a person liable under Section 25501 or 25503, every partner in a 
firm so liable, every principal executive officer or director of a corporation so liable, every person occupying a 
similar status or performing similar functions, every employee of a person so liable who materially aids in the act or 
transaction constituting the violation, and every broker-dealer or agent who materially aids in the act or transaction 
constituting the violation, are also liable jointly and severally with and to the same extent as such person, unless the 
other person who is so liable had no knowledge of or reasonable grounds to believe in the existence of the facts by 
reason of which the liability is alleged to exist. 
CREDIT(S) 
1977 Main Volume 
(Added by Stats. 1968, c. 88, p. 281, § 2, operative Jan. 2, 1969.) 
<General Materials (GM) - References, Annotations, or Tables> 
HISTORICAL AND STATUTORY NOTES 
1977 Main Volume 
Former § 25504, which related to contents of application required of corporate applicant, added by Stats. 1949, c. 
384, p. 708, § 1, was repealed by Stats. 1968, c. 88, p. 243, § 1, operative Jan. 2, 1969 and was derived from 
Stats.l917,c.532,p.675,§ 3; Stats. 1931, c. 423, p. 941, § 2; Stats. 1941, c. 615, p. 2064, § 1. 
LAW REVIEW AND JOURNAL COMMENTARIES 
Collateral participant liability under state securities laws. Douglas M. Branson, 19 Pepp.L.Rev. 1027 (1992). 
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WESTS ANNOTATED CALIFORNIA CODES 
CORPORATIONS CODE 
TITLE 4. SECURITIES 
DIVISION 5. FRANCHISE INVESTMENT LAW 
PART 4. ENFORCEMENT 
CHAPTER 1. CIVIL LIABILITY 
Copr. © West Group 2003. All rights reserved. 
Current through Ch. 3 of 2003-04 Reg.Sess. urgency legislation, 
Ch. 4 of 1st Ex.Sess. urgency legislation, & Ch. 1 of 2nd Ex.Sess. 
§ 31302. Persons connected with sale or offer; joint and several liability 
Every person who directly or indirectly controls a person liable under Section 31300 or 31301, every partner in a 
firm so liable, every principal executive officer or director of a corporation so liable, every person occupying a 
similar status or performing similar functions, every employee of a person so liable who materially aids in the act or 
transaction constituting the violation, are also liable jointly and severally with and to the same extent as such person, 
unless the other person who is so liable had no knowledge of or reasonable grounds to believe in the existence of the 
facts by reason of which the liability is alleged to exist. 
CREDIT(S) 
1977 Main Volume 
(Added by Stats. 1970, c. 1400, p. 2657, § 3, operative Jan. 1, 1971.) 
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LIBRARY REFERENCES 
N 1977 Main Volume 
ALR Library 
Vicarious liability of private franchisor. 81 ALR3d 764. 
Legal Jurisprudences 
Cal Jur 3d Franch Contr § § 33, 34; Franch Priv § 61. 
62 Am Jur 2d Private Franchise Contracts § § 15-17. 
Treatises and Practice Aids 
Witkin, Summary (9th ed) Corp § 288. 
Forms 
B-W Cal Civil Practice: Business Litigation § 23:14. 
Cal Transactions Forms: Business Transactions § § 1:23, 1:24. 
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KANSAS STATUTES ANNOTATED 
CHAPTER 17.-CORPORATIONS 
ARTICLE 12.-SECURITIES 
KANSAS SECURITIES ACT 
COPR. © 2002 By Revisor of Statutes of Kansas 
Current through the 2002 Regular Session 
17-1268. Civil liabilities. 
(a) Any person, who offers or sells a security in violation of K.S.A. 17- 1254 or 17-1255, and amendments thereto, 
or offers or sells a security by means of any untrue statement of a material fact or any omission to state a material 
fact necessary in order to make the statements made in the light of the circumstances under which they are made not 
misleading (the buyer not knowing of the untruth or omission) and who does not sustain the burden of proof that 
such person did not know and in the exercise of reasonable care could not have known of the untruth or omission, is 
liable to the person buying the security from such person, who may sue either at law or in equity to recover the 
consideration paid for the security, together with interest at 15% per annum from the date of payment, costs, and 
reasonable attorney fees, less the amount of any income received on the security, upon the tender of the security, or 
for damages if the buyer no longer owns the security. Damages are the amount that would be recoverable upon a 
tender less: 
(1) The value of the security when the buyer disposed of it; and (2) interest at 15% per annum from the date of 
disposition. 
(b) Every person who directly or indirectly controls a seller liable under subsection (a), every partner, officer, or 
director (or person occupying a similar status or performing similar functions) or employee of such a seller who 
materially aids in the sale, and every broker-dealer or agent who materially aids in the sale is also liable jointly and 
severally with and to the same extent as the seller, unless the nonseller who is so liable sustains the burden of proof 
that such nonseller did not know, and in the exercise of reasonable care could not have known, of the existence of 
the facts by reason of which the liability is alleged to exist. There is contribution as in cases of contract among the 
several persons so liable. 
(c) Any tender specified in this section may be made at any time before entry of judgment. Every cause of action 
under this statute survives the death of any person who might have been a plaintiff or defendant. No person may sue 
under this section if: 
(1) The buyer received a written offer, before suit and at a time when the buyer owned the security, to refund the 
consideration paid, together with interest at 15% per annum from the date of payment, less the amount of any 
income received on the security, and the buyer failed to accept the offer within 30 days of its receipt; or (2) the 
buyer received such an offer before suit and at a time when the buyer did not own the security, unless the buyer 
rejected the offer in writing within 30 days of its receipt. 
(d) No person who has made or engaged in the performance of any contract in violation of any provision of this act 
or any rule and regulation or order hereunder, or who has acquired any purported right under any such contract with 
knowledge of the facts by reason of which its making or performance wasin violation, may base any suit on the 
contract. Any condition, stipulation, or provision binding any person acquiring any security or receiving any 
investment advice to waive compliance with any provision of this act or any rule and regulation or order hereunder 
is void. 
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History: L. 1957, ch. 145, § 17; L. 1967, ch. 122, § 4; L. 1979, ch. 61, § 6; L. 1982, ch. 100, § 1; L. 1997, ch. 62, 
§ 10; July 1. 
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RESEARCH AND PRACTICE AIDS 
1995 Main Volume RESEARCH AND PRACTICE AIDS 
Securities Regulation C ^ 291 et seq. 
C.J.S. Securities Regulation §§ 228, 237. 
LAW REVIEW AND BAR JOURNAL REFERENCES: 
2002 Pocket Part LAW REVIEW AND BAR JOURNAL REFERENCES: 
"Negligence: Protecting Investors By Forcing Brokerage Firms to Disclose Employees' Misconduct rPalmer v. 
Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 622 So. 2d 1085 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993)1," Arthur E. Rhodes, 34 W.L.J. 628, 640, 
641 (1995). 
"Caveat plaintiff: Congress has defederalized private securities litigation," Steven A. Ramirez, 67 J.K.B.A. No. 9, 
16(1998). 
1995 Main Volume LAW REVIEW AND BAR JOURNAL REFERENCES: 
Shareholder liability for watered stock, 8 K.L.R. 644, 655 (1960). 
Mentioned as a remedy for damages incurred in pyramid or founder-member investment operations, 22 K.L.R. 55, 
63 (1973). 
"Securities Registration Under the Kansas Securities Act," Fred B. Lovitch, 22 K.L.R. 565,566 (1974). 
"Recovery of Attorney Fees in Kansas," Mark A. Furney, 18 W.L.J. 535, 557 (1979). 
"Legal Framework Governing the Kansas Non-Profit Corporation-Part II," Fred Lovitch, 48 J.B.A.K. 343, 353 
(1979). 
"Securities And Commodities Arbitration In Kansas," Diane Nygaard, 58 J.K.B.A. No. 10,21, 22 (1989). 
CASE ANNOTATIONS 
1995 Main Volume CASE ANNOTATIONS 
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UNITED STATES CODE ANNOTATED 
TITLE 15. COMMERCE AND TRADE 
CHAPTER 2B--SECURITIES EXCHANGES 
Copr. © West Group 2003. No claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. 
Current through P.L. 108-10, approved 03-11-03 
§ 78aa. Jurisdiction of offenses and suits 
The district courts of the United States and the United States courts of any Territory or other place subject to the 
jurisdiction of the United States shall have exclusive jurisdiction of violations of this chapter or the rules and 
regulations thereunder, and of all suits in equity and actions at law brought to enforce any liability or duty created by 
this chapter or the rules and regulations thereunder. Any criminal proceeding may be brought in the district wherein 
any act or transaction constituting the violation occurred. Any suit or action to enforce any liability or duty created 
by this chapter or rules and regulations thereunder, or to enjoin any violation of such chapter or rules and 
regulations, may be brought in any such district or in the district wherein the defendant is found or is an inhabitant 
or transacts business, and process in such cases may be served in any other district of which the defendant is an 
inhabitant or wherever the defendant may be found. Judgments and decrees so rendered shall be subject to review 
as provided in sections 1254, 1291, 1292, and 1294 of Title 28. No costs shall be assessed for or against the 
Commission in any proceeding under this chapter brought by or against it in the Supreme Court or such other courts. 
CREDIT(S) 
1997 Main Volume 
(June 6, 1934, c. 404, Title I, § 27, 48 Stat. 902; June 25, 1936, c. 804, 49 Stat. 1921; June 25, 1948, c. 646, § 
32(b), 62 Stat. 991; May 24, 1949, c. 139, § 127, 63 Stat. 107; Dec. 4, 1987. Pub.L. 100-181, Title III, § 326, 101 
Stat. 1259.) 
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Revision Notes and Legislative Reports 
1949 Acts. Senate Report No. 303 and House Report No. 352, see 1949 U.S. Code Cong. Service, p. 1248. 
1987 Acts. Senate Report No. 100-105. see 1987 U.S. Code Cong, and Adm. News, p. 2089. 
References in Text 
This chapter, referred to in text, in the original read "this title". See References in Text note set out under § 78a 
of this title. 
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